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Abstract 
Military and civil space acquisitions have received much criticism for their 
inability to produce realistic cost and schedule estimates.  This research seeks to provide 
space systems cost estimators with a forecasting tool for space system cost and schedule 
growth by identifying factors contributing to growth, quantifying the relative impact of 
these factors, and establishing a set of models for predicting space system cost and 
schedule growth.  The analysis considers data from both Department of Defense (DoD) 
and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) space programs.   
The DoD dataset includes 21 space programs that submitted developmental 
Selected Acquisition Reports between 1969 and 2006. The analysis uses multiple 
regression to assess 22 predictor variables, finding that communications missions, ground 
equipment, firm-fixed price contracts, and increased program manager tenure are all 
predictive of lower cost growth for military space systems. 
The NASA analysis includes 71 satellites and spacecraft developed between 1964 
and 2004.  The analysis uses a two-stage logistic and multiple regression approach to 
analyze 31 predictor variables finding that smaller programs (by total cost), more massive 
spacecraft, microgravity missions, and space physics missions are predictive of higher 
cost growth.  For schedule growth, the study finds that larger programs and those 
developed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Northrop Grumman, or international 
developers are predictive of increased schedule growth, whereas those programs 
developed by Johns Hopkins University are predictive of reduced schedule growth.
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PREDICTING COST AND SCHEDULE GROWTH FOR MILITARY AND CIVIL 
SPACE SYSTEMS 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
Over the past decade, the United States has grown increasingly dependent on 
space systems in order to conduct military and civil operations.  The combination of this 
dependence and the recent difficulties in space systems acquisition has given cause for 
alarm among national leaders (Allard, 2005; Defense Science, 2003).  Space acquisition 
programs such as the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High and the National Polar-
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) have received 
considerable national attention (and Congressional criticism) for their excessive cost 
growth.  For example, SBIRS High, originally estimated to cost approximately $4 billion, 
is now anticipated to cost over $10 billion.  Similarly, NPOESS has almost doubled in 
cost growth, from an original estimate of approximately $6 billion to current estimates of 
over $11 billion (Defense, 2003a; Government, 2006).  The extreme cost growth 
experienced by these and other military and civil space acquisition programs has led to 
the perception that the space acquisition process is “broken,” ultimately eroding the 
credibility of the space acquisition community (Allard, 2005; Gourley, 2004; Lee, 2004). 
This study seeks to assist cost estimators by providing the military and civil space 
systems acquisition communities with a set of models for predicting the likelihood and 
quantity of space system cost and schedule growth.  These models will enable space 
system cost estimators to enhance their current estimating techniques as well as identify 
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the primary factors associated with space system cost and schedule growth.  Hopefully, 
the creation of these models will result in better forecasting, and thus decreased future 
cost and schedule growth, in the acquisition of space systems. 
This chapter provides an overview of this study’s efforts to understand and model 
space system cost and schedule growth by examining the space system acquisition 
background, the specific research problem, the research objectives, and the methodology.  
The chapter concludes with an overview of the study results. 
Background: Space System Acquisition 
Military space system acquisition began in the 1950s with the development of 
ballistic missiles by the Western Development Division of the Air Research and 
Development Command (ARDC).  In 1955, ARDC expanded its mission by taking on the 
responsibility of developing the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) first satellite.  Civil 
space system acquisition began in 1958 under the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) as a response to the Soviet launch of Sputnik.  While the DoD 
focused on strategic missile development and defense satellites, NASA’s role included 
human space flight and scientific space exploration (“Brief,” 2005).  Although many of 
the missions for the DoD and NASA overlap (such as space-based communications, 
weather observation, and environmental monitoring), NASA does not fall under the 
purview of the DoD, rather NASA operates as an Independent Agency (“Official,” 2008). 
In 1961, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara gave the Air Force primary 
responsibility for developing all military space systems (History, 2003).  In 2003, the 
DoD reaffirmed the Air Force’s role in developing space systems when Deputy Secretary 
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of Defense Paul Wolfowitz designated the Secretary of the Air Force as the DoD 
Executive Agent for Space1 (Department, 2003a). 
The Air Force’s Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) is the current-day 
successor to the Western Development Division of the 1950s (History, 2003).  SMC was 
originally aligned under the control of Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), the Air 
Force’s primary acquisition arm.  However, in 2001, upon the recommendation of the 
Space Commission, SMC was realigned under the control of Air Force Space Command 
(AFSPC).2  The Space Commission argues that placing SMC under AFSPC would 
consolidate the operational and acquisition functions for space into a single organization, 
thus achieving a “strong center of advocacy for space” as well as fostering an 
organizational climate suitable for developing space professionals (Report, 2001:89-90). 
In addition to having a separate acquisition community for military space systems, 
there is also a separate process.  While typical DoD acquisition follows the process 
outlined in the DoD Instruction 5000.1, “The Defense Acquisition System,” and 5000.2, 
“Operation of the Defense Acquisition System,”3 military space system acquisition 
follows a separate acquisition process described in National Security Space (NSS) 03-01.  
Through NSS 03-01, all DoD space acquisition programs follow a separate reporting 
chain from other DoD programs and are automatically granted waivers from DoD 
                                                 
1 The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) has responsibility for the development of reconnaissance 
satellites (History, 2003:1).  This does not diminish the Air Force’s responsibility for space systems; for, 
the Under Secretary of the Air Force also serves as the Director for the NRO (Department, 2003a:3). 
2 The Space Commission recommends the creation of a Space Corps within the Air Force under AFSPC as 
a mid term solution; in the long term, it recommends a separate military department for space (Report, 
2001:89). 
3 Although Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz cancelled the DoD 5000 series in 2002 
(Wolfowitz, 2002), the DoD acquisition community continues to use much of this process through the 
discretionary use of the Defense Acquisition Guidebook, which details implementation of the DoD 5000 
series (Vogel, 2003:4; “Defense,” 2004). 
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Instruction 5000.2 (Department, 2003b; Fritchman, 2005).  NSS 03-01 provides space 
system acquisition professionals with a flexible and streamlined process tailored towards 
the unique aspects of space system acquisition (Department, 2003b). 
 Military and civil space systems differ from other defense systems in two ways: 
their operational environment and their acquisition life cycle.4  The operational 
environments for space systems are harsh and remote.  Space systems have to deal with 
extremes (such as radiation, charged particles, and the vacuum of space) that land-based 
systems do not.  Additionally, due to the remote nature of the operational environment, it 
is difficult to make corrections or modifications to the systems once they have been 
deployed.  The emphasis placed on system survivability of this harsh environment results 
in large costs for space systems during the early stages of the acquisition life cycle.  
Because testing in the operational environment (space) is unrealistic, space systems 
acquisition places a stronger emphasis on test and evaluation during the development 
phase (Fritchman, 2005; Sellers et al., 2004). 
 In addition to the emphasis placed on the activities of the development phase, 
space systems also differ in their acquisition life cycle.  Space systems are often acquired 
in small quantities and usually do not have maintenance performed on them once they 
become operational.  Because of the limited quantities and the high development cost of 
space systems, their acquisition life cycle does not typically include an extensive 
production phase or the use of prototyping (Fritchman, 2005).  As can be seen in Figure 
1, a typical defense weapon system experiences the majority of its life cycle cost during 
                                                 
4 The acquisition life cycle of a program includes all of the phases for developing and producing a system 
from the initial concept through operations and sustainment of the system (“DAU,” 2007). 
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the operations and support phase, after the system has been deployed.  Space systems, on 
the other hand, experience most of their costs during the system acquisition phase (Figure 
2), where system design, integration, and testing occurs. 
 
 
Figure 1. Typical Weapon System Life Cycle Cost Curve (adapted from Paschall, 2005) 
 
 
Figure 2.  Typical Space System Life Cycle Cost Curve (adapted from Paschall, 2005) 
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NSS 03-01 accommodates the unique life cycle for space systems by offering two 
acquisition models: the NSS Small Quantity System Model (Figure 3) and the NSS Large 
Quantity Production Focused System Model (Figure 4).  The NSS Small Quantity System 
Model is designed for programs that typically acquire ten or less units, such as satellites, 
ground stations, and launch vehicles.  Distinctive features of this model include the 
Follow-on Buy Approval and the Upgrade Decision in Phase C (Figure 3).  The Follow-
on Buy Approval meeting occurs after the first or second unit becomes operational.  
During this meeting, the decision is made as to whether or not to complete the small 
quantity procurement.  The Upgrade Decision meeting provides a forum to approve new 
requirements that occur after Key Decision Point C (Department, 2003b).  The NSS 
Large Quantity Production Focused System Model applies to systems that are typically 
acquired in units of 50 or more.  Large quantity acquisitions for space systems are 
primarily user equipment, such as hand-held user terminals.  The NSS Large Quantity 
Model is similar to the life cycle model used in typical DoD acquisitions.  As can be seen 
from Figure 4, this model includes Low-Rate Initial Production and Full-Rate Production 
in Phase C, which are common in standard DoD acquisitions (Department, 2003b). 
 7
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The Government Accountability Office (GAO) notes a number of other 
differences between NSS 03-01 and the DoD 5000 series including the use of a Defense 
Space Acquisition Board (DSAB) early in the acquisition process, an emphasis on a 
revolutionary acquisition approach, and not requiring commitment to fully fund the 
program.  While the Air Force claims that the use of DSABs will result in early problem 
identification and enable early involvement of senior leadership, the GAO argues that the 
DSAB will result in investment decisions being made earlier in the process, before 
critical technologies are mature enough to enter product development.  The GAO 
expresses concern about NSS 03-01’s practice of encouraging programs to incorporate 
cutting-edge technologies through a revolutionary approach; it argues that the 
simultaneous development of product and technology results in higher risk programs.  
Additionally, NSS 03-01 does not require a commitment to fully fund the program at 
program initiation (Milestone B), whereas other DoD acquisition programs are required 
to commit to full funding upon initiation.  Rather, NSS 03-01 gives the DoD Space 
Milestone Decision Authority the flexibility to discontinue funding the program as late as 
the Follow-on Buy Decision, which occurs after the first few units have become 
operational.  The GAO argues that these key differences between NSS 03-01 and 
traditional acquisition policy encourage space systems acquisition to take on unnecessary 
technical, schedule, and cost risk (Government, 2004a; Department, 2003b).  The GAO’s 
concerns about the risks in space acquisition and the ramification of these risks are not 
unfounded.  Numerous cost, schedule, and technical problems are occurring within 
current space system acquisitions, causing Congress and the American public to believe 
that the space system acquisition process is “broken” (Tauscher, 2007; Lee, 2004).   
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Concerns over cost and schedule growth are not limited to the DoD; the GAO has 
also criticized NASA for its inability to produce realistic cost and schedule estimates. 
While NASA points to technical problems and funding shortages as major contributors to 
cost and schedule growth, the GAO finds that the problem is not a program management 
issue, but rather that NASA lacks a rigorous process for accurately estimating cost and 
schedule.  NASA cost estimators lack access to sound financial and technical data, and 
thus are unable to produce reliable estimates (Government, 2004b). 
In response to the criticisms of the GAO and other criticisms, NASA recently 
revamped its procedural requirements.  The revised NASA Procedural Requirements, 
NPR 7120.5D standardizes the program life-cycle and program reviews, as well as 
incorporates the Key Decision Points (KDPs) found in the defense acquisition life cycle 
(Blythe, 2007).  Figure 5 displays the acquisition life cycle found in NPR 7120.5D.  In 
many ways, the process is similar to the DoD’s space acquisition process, with heavy 
emphasis placed on the upfront development activities and requiring approval at each 
KDP in order to progress to the next phase.  According to NPR 7120.5D, “NASA places 
significant emphasis on project formulation” (National, 2007).  The emphasis on early 
program formulation through the number and frequency of technical and programmatic 
reviews appears to exceed the reviews outlined by NSS 03-01 for defense space systems.  
During Pre-Systems Acquisition, prior to program implementation at KDP C, NASA 
space systems can expect to go through four program reviews: Mission Concept Review 
(MCR), System Requirements Review (SRR), System Definition Review (SDR), and 
Preliminary Design Review (PDR).  DoD space systems, on the other hand, are only 
subject to one review, SRR, during their Pre-Systems Acquisition Phase. 
 10
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Research Problem: Space System Cost and Schedule Growth 
 
How can the military and civil space acquisition communities correct their 
problems of excessive cost and schedule growth?  One critical step is to improve cost and 
schedule estimates for space systems acquisition.  As with its assessment regarding 
NASA, the GAO finds that DoD space cost estimators are producing unrealistic 
estimates.  In the DoD’s case, space cost estimators have a tendency to make unrealistic 
assumptions, thus creating estimates that are highly optimistic.  This underestimation of 
program costs leads to cost growth as the programs develop (Government, 2006).   
What is wrong with optimistic cost and schedule estimates?  Underestimating 
program costs or schedules hinders senior leadership’s ability to effectively plan and 
make decisions.  When a program’s cost or schedule estimate does not reflect reality, 
financial planners are unable to adequately allocate the correct budgetary resources for 
the correct time.  As a program requires more funds than were originally planned, 
decision makers have to respond by either reducing the quantity or performance for the 
system, or they have to reallocate funds from other programs in order to make up for the 
shortfall (Arena et al., 2006).  Reallocating funds from other programs negatively impacts 
these programs’ ability to meet their respective schedule and performance requirements.  
Regardless of whether decision makers choose to have the funding shortfall impact the 
original program or another program, the end result is that the delivered mix of 
capabilities will not meet those that were originally intended by strategic planners.  A 
similar problem occurs if changes to the schedule result in funds being required at a 
different time than originally planned.  Additionally, increases in schedule affect the 
capability mix by not delivering systems to the end users at the appropriate time. 
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Another consequence of cost and schedule growth is that it decreases the 
credibility of cost estimators and the space acquisition community, which can ultimately 
hinder space acquisition programs.  United States Senator Wayne Allard (2005) 
expressed this sentiment at a Space Policy and Architecture Symposium:  
The Air Force and its contractors have lost all credibility with Congress when it 
comes to space acquisition programs. My colleagues and I are no longer surprised 
by additional cost increases or notices of further schedule delays. Nor do some in 
Congress give much credence to the Air Force’s proposals to fix these programs. 
The Congress’s lack of confidence in Air Force space acquisition management 
has resulted in enormous reductions in funding for space programs. 
 
Senator Allard’s comment reveals that this loss of credibility has already resulted in a 
Congressional response of reducing funds for space programs.  Thus, in addition to 
funding shortfalls from underestimating costs, the space acquisition community also has 
to struggle with funding reductions caused by their loss in credibility. 
 This study seeks to mitigate these impacts of cost and schedule growth by 
providing space systems cost estimators with a forecasting tool for space system cost and 
schedule growth.  In so doing, this study identifies factors contributing to space system 
cost and schedule growth, quantifies the relative impact of these factors, and provides a 
set of models for predicting space system cost and schedule growth. 
Research Objectives 
 
The purpose of this study is to answer the question, “Is it possible to create a set 
of models that accurately predict the likelihood and quantity of cost and schedule growth 
for space systems?”  In order to answer this research question, this study first examines 
five Investigative Questions (IQs): 
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IQ1. Which systems should be considered “space systems”? 
For the purpose of this study, which systems should be considered space systems?  
As discussed herein, military space system acquisition began with the Western 
Development Division, which was responsible for acquiring both strategic missiles and 
satellites.  The current day space acquisition arm for the Air Force, SMC, is responsible 
for acquiring launch vehicles and ground equipment in addition to the satellites and land-
based strategic missiles acquired by its predecessor (History, 2003).  Civil space system 
acquisition on the other hand, focuses primarily on satellites and spacecraft.  With 
regards to military systems should “space systems” include all of these types of systems 
since the space acquisition community holds the responsibility for acquiring them? Or 
should “space systems” refer only to those that fall under NSS Small Quantity System 
Model, which are similar to civil space systems? 
This study chooses to include strategic missiles, launch vehicles, and ground 
equipment in the definition of space system.  However, recognizing that strategic missiles 
are not being widely acquired today and that these systems do not fall under NSS 03-01, 
the study also opts to provide models that exclude these systems.  See Chapter II for 
further information on space system definitions. 
IQ2. What are the current methods for calculating cost and schedule growth?   
By examining the current methods for calculating cost and schedule growth, this 
study can select an appropriate method for calculating growth.  For cost growth, this 
investigative question includes the determination of which aspects of cost growth are 
important.  That is, do all increases in cost qualify as cost growth?  Perhaps some 
increases in cost do not reflect a true increase in the costs estimated for the original 
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program.  For example, an increase in cost due to a change in the number of units 
procured is a change to the program itself, rather than a change to the estimated cost of 
the original program. 
This study calculates cost and schedule growth as a percentage of the initial 
estimate, occurring during the development period of the space system.  The calculations 
include quantity and inflation adjustments, where appropriate.  See Chapters III and IV 
for further details on calculating cost and schedule growth. 
IQ3. What characteristics of the program or acquisition environment are good 
predictors of cost and schedule growth?   
In order to accurately predict cost and schedule growth, this study needs to 
identify characteristics of the program and acquisition environment that could be 
predictors of cost growth.  One of the primary goals of this study is to identify the best 
predictors of growth and to quantitatively assess the relative impact that these predictors 
have on growth.  The analysis examines numerous predictor variables including: 
commodity type, mission area, program size, and prime contractor, in order to establish a 
set of models for predicting space system cost and schedule growth.  See Chapter III for 
more details on the predictor variables analyzed. 
IQ4. What are the current methodologies for predicting cost and schedule growth?   
Assessing the relationship between the potential predictors and cost and schedule 
growth requires selecting an appropriate methodology.  Because this is an exploratory 
analysis, it is useful to review other methodologies for modeling cost and schedule 
growth in order to determine if this research can apply these techniques in whole or in 
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part.  Additionally, understanding the range of methodologies available assists in 
revealing the strengths and limitations of the methodologies incorporated into this study. 
IQ5. How can the cost and schedule growth models be validated?  
By implementing model diagnostics for validating predictive models, this study is 
able to assess how accurately the models predict future cost and schedule growth.  
Validating the models ensures the robustness of the models as a predictive tool, and that 
the models will be useful to military and civil space system cost estimating and 
acquisition communities.  
Methodology 
 
Due to the difference in available data for DoD and NASA space systems, this 
study analyzes military and civil systems separately.  The analysis of DoD space systems 
applies linear regression to identify predictors for military space system cost growth.  
Unfortunately, adequate data were not available for assessing schedule growth for 
military space systems.   
In order to analyze NASA space systems cost and schedule growth, this study 
uses a two-staged regression methodology developed by Sipple (2002).  The study uses 
this two-stage approach due to the bimodal nature of the cost and schedule growth data 
(see Chapter III for further details on the bimodal distribution of the data).  The analysis 
adapts Sipple’s two-staged approach by first using logistic regression in order to assess 
the likelihood that a NASA space system will experience high or low growth.  The 
second stage uses multiple regression analysis in order to model the expected amount of 
growth.  See Chapter III for further details on the methodology. 
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Study Results 
 The DoD cost growth analysis reveals that communications missions, ground 
equipment, firm-fixed price contracts, and increased program manager tenure are all 
predictive of lower cost growth. 
The NASA cost growth analysis found that larger program size decreased the 
likelihood of being a high cost growth program, where as more massive spacecrafts and 
microgravity missions increased the likelihood of being a high cost growth program.  For 
those NASA programs that are likely to experience high cost growth, the amount of cost 
growth increases for those programs from a space physics mission.  For NASA programs 
in which the logistic models predict that low cost growth is likely, program start date is 
the best predictor of quantity of cost growth, with more recent programs associated with 
lower cost growth. 
The NASA schedule growth analysis found that larger programs (measured in 
size of budget) are more likely to experience high schedule growth.  For those programs 
likely to experience high schedule growth, the linear regressions reveal that those 
programs developed by JPL or an International developer (outside of the U.S.) experience 
a greater quantity of schedule growth.  For those programs likely to experience low 
schedule growth, those developed by Northrop Grumman are associated with increased 
schedule growth, where as those space systems developed by Johns Hopkins are 
associated with a reduced quantity of schedule growth.  See Chapters IV and V for more 
details on the study’s results. 
 
 
 17
Organization of the Study 
 
 This chapter included an overview of the problem area, the research and 
investigative questions, and the methodology.  Chapter II presents a literature review 
which begins to explore Investigative Questions 1-4 on defining space systems, 
calculating cost growth, identifying potential predictors of cost growth, and identifying 
methodologies for prediction cost growth.  Chapter III provides a detailed discussion on 
the data and methodology, concluding the discussion on Investigative Questions 1-4, as 
well as addressing Investigative Question 5 on validation methods.  Chapter IV details 
the preliminary, logistic, and multiple regression analysis of the data, as well as detailing 
the diagnostic tools used for validating the models.  Chapter V concludes the study with a 
discussion of the results. 
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II. Literature Review 
Chapter Overview 
 This literature review examines previous acquisition cost and schedule growth 
studies in order to gain a greater understanding of space system cost and schedule growth 
and how best to analyze it.  In so doing, this chapter begins the study’s exploration of 
four of the investigative questions introduced in Chapter I: 
1. Which systems should be considered “space systems”? 
2. What are the current methods for calculating cost and schedule growth? 
3. What characteristics of the program or acquisition environment are good 
predictors of cost and schedule growth? 
4. What are the current methodologies for predicting cost and schedule growth? 
This literature review examines these four investigative questions by establishing the 
scope of the literature, identifying definitions for “space system,” detailing methods for 
calculating cost and schedule growth, discussing candidate predictor variables, and 
evaluating past methodologies. 
Literature Scope 
 As discussed in Chapter I, this study focuses on cost and schedule growth for 
military and civil space systems.  Due to the limited number of space system cost and 
schedule growth studies, this literature review also considers research focusing on 
acquisition of all types of Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs).5  Recent 
                                                 
5 Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) are defense programs that have an estimated Research, 
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) cost of over $365 million or an estimated Procurement cost 
of more than $2.19 billion.  Additionally, high interest programs not meeting these requirements can be 
designated as MDAPs by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
USD(AT&L) (“Life,” 2004). 
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studies analyzing space system cost growth are primarily qualitative (Defense Science, 
2003; Salas, 2004; Government, 2006).  Although the space acquisition community has 
placed considerable effort in modeling cost (Bearden, 2000/2001; Tieu et al., 2000), there 
is a dearth of quantitative analysis on space system cost growth.  Recent quantitative 
studies on space system cost growth appear to be limited to two NASA studies: Tyson et 
al.’s (1992a) and Schaffer’s (2004). 
 However, cost growth studies examining all MDAPs have been plentiful.  Most of 
these studies use Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) (which contain program costs and 
cost estimates) as their source for cost data.  All MDAPs are required to submit SARs to 
Congress annually, with “exception SARs” submitted on a quarterly basis if major 
changes occur (Hough, 1992).  Most DoD cost growth studies use SAR data to examine 
weapon system cost growth across multiple services and multiple platforms.  These 
studies may include cost growth data for space systems; however, these studies do not 
conduct separate analyses on the relationship between predictors of cost growth and 
space system cost growth. 
Cost growth literature for defense programs and space systems far exceeds the 
available literature for schedule growth.  There are many possible reasons for the limited 
number of schedule growth studies.  Cashman (1995) identifies attitudes regarding lack 
of control over schedule and beliefs that schedule growth on one program does not 
translate to other programs as the reasons for limited research.  Cross (2006) points out 
other limitations, especially when using SAR data, including minimal reporting 
requirements and inconsistencies in schedule baselines.  Quantitative schedule growth 
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studies examine all defense weapons systems; there do not appear to be any focused 
solely on space systems. 
DoD cost and schedule growth studies referenced in this literature review include, 
but are not limited to, studies performed by the RAND Corporation, Institute for Defense 
Analyses (IDA), Management Consulting and Research (MCR), Air Force Institute of 
Technology (AFIT) students, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) students, and the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG).  The DoD 
cost and schedule growth studies conducted by RAND and IDA consist of a series of 
analyses performed in the early 1990s (Drezner et al., 1993; Tyson et al., 1992b, Drezner 
and Smith, 1990), as well as a follow-on series performed in the mid-2000s (Arena et al., 
2006; McNicol, 2005).  Both the current and historical RAND and IDA cost and schedule 
growth studies primarily center on descriptive statistics.6   
 In addition to the recent RAND and IDA cost and schedule growth studies, a 
series of AFIT theses analyze DoD weapon system cost and schedule growth.  Unlike the 
RAND and IDA studies, the AFIT theses employ more rigorous statistical methods, such 
as logistic and multiple regression analysis.  These statistical techniques model cost and 
schedule growth, thus enabling the researcher to make predictions regarding cost and 
schedule growth for systems not included in the sample.  Another key difference is that 
the AFIT theses examine subsets of total cost growth, for example, schedule or 
engineering changes (Foreman, 2007; Cross, 2006; Monaco, 2005; Genest, 2004; Lucas, 
2004; McDaniel, 2004; Rossetti, 2004; Bielecki, 2003; Moore, 2003; Sipple, 2002). 
                                                 
6 Descriptive statistics employ visual methods in order to summarize the characteristics of the data in the 
sample, as opposed to inferential statistics which use the data to make predictions about the population 
from which the sample was drawn (McClave et al., 2005:5) 
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Defining “Space System” 
 In order to analyze space system cost and schedule growth, this study must 
consider Investigative Question 1, “Which systems should be considered ‘space 
systems’?”  Tyson et al., in their study on NASA and DoD space systems, define a space 
system as “a collection of integrated components to achieve a specific purpose beyond 
the Earth’s atmosphere, such as Earth observation or planetary exploration” (1992a:4).  
From this definition, those systems operating in the space environment ought to be 
considered space systems.  Thus, satellites and non-orbiting spacecraft are clearly space 
systems.  But what about systems designed to support these missions, such as launch 
vehicles or satellite terminals?  Are they not also “space systems”? 
Sellers et al. (2004), in Understanding Space,7 describe the space mission 
architecture as being composed of six parts: the mission, the spacecraft, the trajectories 
and orbits, the launch vehicle, the mission operations systems, and the mission 
management and operations.  This interpretation is considerably broader than Tyson et 
al.'s (1992a) by including the associated launch vehicles and infrastructure. 
Another approach to defining “space system” is to examine which systems are 
operated and acquired by the space segments of the DoD.  Air Force Space Command 
(AFSPC) operates all space forces for the Air Force.  AFSPC operations involve the 
control of space-based satellites, ground-based terminals and early warning radars, and 
strategic missiles.  The Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) is the acquisition arm 
for AFSPC and is the primary acquirer for DoD space systems (“Air,” 2007).  SMC 
                                                 
7 The Understanding Space textbook is widely used in Air Force space education, including courses taught 
at the Air Force Academy, the Air Force Institute of Technology, and the Space and Missile Systems 
Center. 
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acquires satellite systems, launch vehicles, land-based ballistic missiles, and space system 
ground equipment (History, 2003).  Thus, from the current DoD perspective, space 
system operations and acquisition not only includes all of the systems provided in Sellers 
et al.’s (2004) interpretation, but also includes strategic missiles.  Similar to the Air 
Force, the Army consolidates its missile acquisition and operations with its other space 
system acquisition and operations under a single organization, the U.S. Army Space and 
Missile Defense Command (“U.S.,” 2007). 
How have other cost and schedule growth studies defined “space systems”?  
Unfortunately, most DoD studies avoid defining “space system” when referring to 
weapon system types, choosing instead to segment these types of systems into separate 
categories such as “satellites,” “launch vehicles,” and “missiles” (Arena et al., 2006; 
Tyson et al., 1992b; Wolf, 1990).  As for the limited number of DoD studies that 
reference space systems, satellites and launch vehicles are consistently treated as space 
systems, while strategic missile systems vary.  McCrillis (2003) separates strategic 
missiles from tactical missiles, choosing to include strategic missile systems in the space 
category.  Drezner et al. (1993) combine strategic missiles with tactical missiles into a 
single “missile” category. 
Cost and Schedule Growth Definition and Calculation 
 In addition to exploring the possible definitions for “space system,” this study 
must also Investigative Question 2, “What are the current methods for calculating cost 
and schedule growth?”  This section first examines cost growth, which includes three 
main elements: the cost growth formula, the variance types, and the inflation and quantity 
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adjustments.  This section concludes with an examination of schedule growth 
calculations. 
 Cost Growth Formula 
 Cost growth is a comparison of cost variance to the original cost estimate.  Cost 
variance is defined as the difference between planned cost (original baseline cost 
estimate) and actual cost (or updated cost estimate) (Department, 1980).  Cost growth 
studies calculate cost growth in one of two ways.  The first approach is to calculate cost 
growth as a percentage of the original cost estimate (McNichols and McKinney, 1981; 
Pannell, 1994; Bielecki and White, 2005): 
 
Cost Growth   =   (Actual-Estimate)           (1) 
Estimate 
 
Equation 1 provides cost growth as a percentage, where a value of “zero” means the is no 
cost growth, a negative value means that the actual cost is less than the planned costs, and 
a positive value means that the actual cost is greater than the planned cost. 
 The second approach is to calculate cost growth as a cost growth factor (CGF) or 
cost growth ratio (CGR).  This approach simply divides the actual cost (or updated cost 
estimate) into the planned cost (Arena et al., 2006; McCrillis, 2003; Tyson et al., 1994; 
Drezner et al., 1993): 
 
     Cost Growth   =   (Actual)                    (2) 
          Estimate 
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Equation 2 provides cost growth as a factor, where a value equal to one means there is no 
cost growth, a value less than one means that the actual cost is less than the planned cost, 
and a value greater than one means that the actual cost is greater than the planned cost. 
 In addition to identifying approaches to calculate cost growth, one must also 
define the components of the cost growth formula: estimated cost and actual cost.  DoD 
cost growth studies typically use the Development Estimate (DE), which is the estimate 
submitted for Milestone B, as the baseline estimate.8  The DE is the best estimate to 
capture the program’s planned cost because at this point the major design and capability 
trade-offs have occurred and the program office is ready to begin system development  
(“Defense Acquisition,” 2007; Jarvaise et al., 1996; Department, 1980). 
 While cost growth studies agree on which estimate to use as the baseline cost, 
there is some variation in which estimate to use as the actual cost.  A number of studies 
use the current estimate as actual cost (McCrillis, 2003; Drezner et al., 1993; McNichols 
and McKinney, 1981).  By using the current estimate, not all programs will be at the 
same stage in their development; some programs will be in the beginning of their 
development, some programs will be near the end of their development, and some may 
even be complete.  Those programs that are near the end of development or are complete 
will have incurred a higher proportion of their cost growth than those at the beginning.  
Basing calculations on programs at different stages of development may cause those at 
the beginning of their development process to bias the results because they have not yet 
experienced most of their cost growth.  Arena et al. (2006) show that programs continue 
                                                 
8 Milestone B, previously known as Milestone II, marks program initiation and is the point where a DoD 
weapon system enters System Development and Demonstration.   
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to incur cost growth until approximately 70-80% of their development and production has 
been completed.  Because of this tendency to incur cost growth through the later stages of 
development and production, Arena et al. (2006) choose to include only completed 
programs; therefore, their analysis consists of only final system costs. 
Most DoD cost growth studies, however, use a mix of completed and on-going 
programs.  McNicol (2005) sets a minimum requirement for programs to be at least three 
years past Milestone B to qualify for inclusion in his cost growth study.  Other 
researchers place a limit on the time frame by using costs from Milestone B up to the 
initial operational capability (IOC) date, but do not include costs occurring after IOC 
(Tyson et al., 1992b; Wolf, 1990). 
 Variance Types 
 As previously mentioned, most DoD cost growth studies use SARs as their source 
for cost data.  SARs include the original DE and current estimates (CE).  Differences 
between the DE and the CE are called “variances” and are separated into seven 
categories: Economic, Quantity, Schedule, Engineering, Estimating, Support, and Other  
(Hough, 1992; Department, 1980).  See Chapter III for a more detailed discussion of the 
SAR. 
 Most studies agree that variances due to inflation (Economic category) or quantity 
constitute unforeseen cost growth, and thus choose to adjust either the DE or the CE for 
these types of cost growth (see section on Inflation and Quantity Adjustments).  RAND, 
IDA, AFIT, and NPS studies typically combine the other five cost variances 
(Engineering, Schedule, Support, Estimating, and Other), focusing on total cost growth 
adjusted for quantity and inflation (Arena et al., 2006; Drezner et al., 1993; Tyson et al., 
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1994; Tyson et al., 1992b; Moore, 2003; Genest, 2004; Lucas, 2004; Wolf, 1990).  Fast 
(2007), in “Sources of Program Cost Growth,” argues that because Quantity, Economic, 
Estimating, and Other variances represent changes that are beyond the cost estimator’s 
ability to forecast, these categories do not constitute actual cost growth; rather, it is the 
combination of Engineering, Schedule, and Support that constitutes actual cost growth.  
DoD cost growth studies examining total cost growth have yet to adopt this 
recommendation to exclude the Estimating and Other categories and focus solely on the 
combination of Engineering, Schedule, and Support. 
 Instead of considering total cost growth, several AFIT theses examine these 
categories separately in order to isolate the predictors for these individual aspects of cost 
growth.  Sipple (2002) examines cost growth due to Engineering varinaces within the 
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) appropriation.  Bielecki (2003) 
builds on this work by individually examining the RDT&E appropriation for the four 
other categories: Estimating, Schedule, Support, and Other.  Rossetti (2004) complements 
both sets of work by examining the Estimating and Support categories for the 
Procurement appropriation, whereas McDaniel (2004) analyzes the Engineering and 
Schedule categories for the Procurement appropriation. 
 Although using SAR variance categories is the primary method for analyzing cost 
growth, several studies use the variance categories created by the DoD Office of the 
Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E).  PA&E uses SAR data to create 
its own cost database, dividing variances between those that are attributed to mistakes 
and those that are attributed to decisions.  The mistake variance is further divided into 
five subcategories: production, development and engineering, logistics support, schedule 
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and management factors, and other.  Similarly, the decision variance is divided into five 
subcategories: requirements, schedule, logistics support, external factors, and other.  IDA, 
CAIG, and NPS have taken advantage of this database in order to characterize cost 
variances attributable to decisions and mistakes (McNicol, 2005; McCrillis, 2003; 
Pannell, 1994). 
 Inflation and Quantity Adjustments 
 DoD cost growth studies use one of two methods to adjust for inflation: 1) convert 
all program costs to base-year dollars for that system or 2) adjust costs for all programs to 
a standard base year.  Most studies, including those done by RAND, IDA, and MCR, use 
base-year dollars to adjust for inflation when calculating cost growth (Arena et al., 2006; 
Drezner et al., 1993; Tyson et al., 1992b; McNichols and McKinney, 1981).  Recent 
studies using the PA&E database adjust for inflation by converting all program cost data 
to Fiscal Year (FY) 2000 constant dollars (McNicol, 2005; McCrillis, 2003).  AFIT 
theses take a similar approach, converting base-year dollars for each program into a 
standard base year (Lucas, 2004; Bielecki, 2003; Sipple, 2002). 
 In addition to adjusting for inflation, DoD cost growth studies also adjust for 
variances due to quantity changes because cost estimators create the DE with the original 
planned quantity in mind and do not incorporate adjustments for quantity changes.  To 
adjust for quantity, DoD cost growth studies take one of two approaches: 1) adjust the CE 
to reflect baseline quantities or 2) adjust the DE to reflect current/final quantities.  
Adjusting the CE to reflect baseline quantities provides cost growth in terms of the initial 
cost estimate and prevents a “floating baseline,” where the quantity used for calculations 
changes from year to year (Drezner et al., 1993).  On the other hand, adjusting the DE to 
 28
reflect current quantities allows the researcher to modify estimates while keeping actual 
costs intact.  When calculating total cost growth with both RDT&E and Procurement 
appropriations, adjusting the DE to the current quantity maintains the proportion of 
procurement cost to total cost (Arena et al., 2006). 
 After selecting whether to use the baseline or current quantity, the researcher must 
then make the necessary adjustments to the CE or DE.  Hough (1992) offers three 
methods for performing this quantity normalization: 
1. Normalize using variance listed in the SAR Quantity category only, 
2. Normalize using cost-quantity curves, thus adjusting all variances that occur 
at other than baseline quantities, or 
3. Normalize using a hybrid approach by adjusting for quantity-related variances 
(both those listed in SAR Quantity category as well as those listed in other 
categories but described as quantity-related in the narrative portion of the 
SAR) and then adjusting the remaining variance using cost-quantity curves. 
Although Hough (1992) recommends using either cost-quantity curves or the hybrid 
approach, most AFIT theses implement the first approach and exclude cost variances 
listed in the Quantity category (Genest, 2004; Bielecki, 2003; Sipple, 2002).  One 
exception is Abate’s (2004) thesis on missile system cost growth which uses the hybrid 
approach.  DoD cost growth studies performed by RAND, IDA, and CAIG implement 
cost-quantity curves (also known as learning curves, cost improvement curves, or price 
improvement curves) either directly or through the hybrid approach (Arena et al., 2006; 
McNicol, 2005; McCrillis, 2003; Drezner et al., 1993; Tyson et al., 1992b). 
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 Calculating Schedule Growth 
 As with cost growth, schedule growth is most commonly calculated either as a 
percentage of the planned length or as a ratio between actual and planned length 
(Foreman, 2007; Cross, 2006; Monaco, 2005; Wolf, 1990).  Other methods for 
calculating schedule growth include measuring just the raw increase in length in terms of 
how much the actual length exceeded the planned length (Drezner and Smith, 1990).  In 
addition to measuring schedule growth in terms of length, Cashman (1995) also provides 
calculations for schedule growth in dollar terms and in frequency of schedule changes. 
Predictor Variables 
 In addition to presenting methods for calculating the response variable (cost or 
schedule growth), the literature reveals an array of possible predictor variables to assist in 
answering Investigative Question 3, “What characteristics of the program or acquisition 
environment are good predictors of cost and schedule growth?”  This discussion begins 
by reviewing quantitative DoD cost growth studies for predictors of cost and schedule 
growth, which are grouped into three categories: program attributes, management 
practices and acquisition strategies, and external factors.  The discussion concludes with 
an examination of predictors identified by qualitative studies focused exclusively on 
space systems. 
 Program Attributes 
 Cost and schedule growth studies compare a variety of program attributes, in 
order to identify those program attributes that consistently correspond with high or low 
growth.  The primary program attributes associated with cost growth are commodity type 
and program size, whereas the primary characteristic associated with schedule growth is 
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program volatility.  Both cost growth and schedule growth studies identify degree of 
technical difficulty as a predictor of growth.   
 Commodity Type.  A number of studies compare cost growth across commodity 
types, such as aircraft, ships, land vehicles, and missiles.  As discussed herein, there is 
some differentiation on the commodity classification; for example, some researchers 
choose to place satellites, launch vehicles, and strategic missiles into separate commodity 
classes (Arena et al., 2006) while others choose to combine these into a single space 
commodity class (McCrillis, 2003).  Studies that consider space as a single commodity 
class consistently find space systems to be associated with higher cost growth (McDaniel, 
2004:83-97; Rossetti, 2004:93-99; McCrillis, 2003).  As seen in Figure 6, space systems 
experience considerably greater total cost growth than other types of DoD programs.  
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are numbers of programs.
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Figure 6.  Total Program Cost Growth by Commodity (McCrillis, 2003) 
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 Program Size.  When considering program size, cost growth studies consistently 
find that smaller programs (that is, lower cost programs) have higher cost growth than 
larger programs (McCrillis, 2003; Dameron et al., 2002; Pannell, 1994; Drezner et al., 
1993).  As seen in Figure 7, programs with Milestone II estimates (DEs) greater than $10 
billion are unlikely to experience more than 50% cost growth, whereas a number of 
systems with estimates below $10 billion have experienced greater than 50% cost growth. 
Drezner et al. (1993) offer three possible explanations for smaller programs incurring 
high cost growth: 1) oversight is often less for smaller programs, 2) equivalent increases 
in cost are proportionally greater for smaller programs, and 3) R&D costs (which tend to 
have higher cost growth than procurement costs) consist of a greater proportion of the 
total cost for smaller programs.  While Tyson et al. (1992a) find this relationship to be the 
case for DoD space programs, they observe that NASA space programs are the opposite, 
with larger NASA programs experiencing higher cost growth.  However, a more recent 
study of NASA programs contradicts this conclusion, finding that both NASA and DoD 
programs experience lower cost growth as program size increases (Schaffer, 2004). 
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Figure 7. Total Cost Growth by Program Size (McCrillis, 2003) 
 
 Program Volatility.  DoD schedule growth studies find that volatility is one of the 
main factors associated with higher schedule growth.  These studies measure volatility in 
a variety of ways including the number of changes to the original estimate (Foreman, 
2007; Cross, 2006), funding instability (Foreman, 2007; Drezner and Smith, 1990), 
technical problems, and design changes (Cashman, 1995; Drezner and Smith, 1990). 
 Technical Difficulty.  DoD cost and schedule growth studies evaluate the degree 
of technical difficulty by comparing cost or schedule growth of new programs to those 
that have predecessor programs.  One would expect that new programs would be more 
technically challenging (and thus have higher cost or schedule growth) than modification 
programs that build upon predecessor programs.  Drezner et al. (1993) find that 
modification programs experience lower average total cost and lower cost growth, as 
 33
shown in Table 1.  Other studies also consistently show this scenario to be the case, with 
new programs having higher cost or schedule growth than modification programs (Cross, 
2006; McNicol, 2005; Monaco, 2005; Tyson et al., 1992b). 
 
Table 1.  Modifications Versus New Programs (Drezner et al., 1993) 
          
  
Cost 
Growth 
Factor 
Number of 
Observations 
Average Program 
Cost (billions, 
FY90$) 
Average Age 
(years past 
EMD) 
Modification 1.16 36 4.0 8.9 
New Start 1.21 84 6.1 9.7 
     
 
 
 
 Management Practices and Acquisition Strategies 
 DoD cost and schedule growth studies also examine the impact of management 
practices and acquisition strategies on growth.  These practices and strategies include 
acquiring service, schedule characteristics, contract type, and prototyping.  
 Acquiring Service.  DoD cost growth studies disagree on the impact of service 
type on cost growth.  In their study for MCR, McNichols and McKinney (1981) find that 
the Army tends to have higher cost growth than the other services.  This finding is 
confirmed by a RAND study in 1993 (Drezner et al., 1993) and more recently by an IDA 
study in 2005 (McNicol, 2005).  Recent AFIT theses, on the other hand, are mixed with 
some finding Navy involvement to be associated with higher cost growth (McDaniel, 
2004), while others find Navy involvement to be associated with lower cost growth 
(Rossetti, 2004; Bielecki, 2003).  To further confound these results, a number of studies 
have found that there is no difference in cost growth among services (Arena et al., 2006; 
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Pannell, 1994).  Pannell (1994) explains that studies relying on data from the early 1980s 
are likely to find Army programs experiencing high cost growth because the Army was 
going though its modernization program.  He suggests that more recent data reflect the 
completion of Army modernization and that the Army is now better able to control 
program costs. Drezner et al. (1993) explain that Army programs are more likely to have 
higher cost growth because the Army programs in their dataset tend to be smaller and 
older than the Navy and Air Force programs.  Thus, some of the cost growth attributed to 
service may actually be due to size and age. 
 Schedule Characteristics.  AFIT theses find that schedule characteristics, such as 
the length of the Research and Development (R&D) Phase or the length of the Production 
Phase, are good indicators of both the likelihood of cost growth and the amount of cost 
growth.  The most consistent finding is a positive relationship between the length of the 
R&D phase and cost growth; that is, longer R&D phases correspond with increased cost 
growth (Lucas, 2004; McDaniel, 2004; Bielecki, 2003; Sipple, 2002).  AFIT studies find 
lower schedule growth for programs with a Phase A, programs that have a longer Phase 
A plus planned Phase B, and for programs that have their Milestone C prior to their 
Initial Operational Capability (IOC) date (Foreman, 2007; Cross, 2006; Monaco, 2005). 
 Contract Type.  As for acquisition strategies, IDA finds that multi-year 
procurement contracts and development contracts that include incentives tend to have 
lower cost growth (Tyson et al., 1992b).  McNicol (2005) finds that total package 
procurement contracts result in higher cost growth, and Rossetti (2004) finds that fixed-
price contracts decrease the likelihood of cost growth occurring. 
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 Prototyping.  The literature is mixed on the impact of prototyping on cost growth.  
IDA finds prototyping to be an effective tool for reducing cost growth (Tyson et al., 
1992b); however, RAND finds that programs with prototyping experience higher cost 
growth (Drezner et al., 1993). 
 External Factors 
 External factors impacting cost and schedule growth include acquisition reform, 
political party, and external guidance.  In Abate’s (2004) study on the impact of 
acquisition reform on cost growth of tactical missiles, he finds that missile systems 
reporting their Milestone B estimate during the post-acquisition reform period (1997-
2001) experience higher cost growth than those reporting in the pre-acquisition reform 
period (1991-1996).  In Wolf’s (1990) study on political impacts on cost and schedule 
growth, he finds that both cost and schedule growth are higher for programs that are 
initiated during times when the Democratic Party has a strong majority in Congress.  
Gounatidis (2006) finds that a Democratic President correlates with reduced cost 
overruns for that year.9  In addition, Gounatidis (2006) finds that having the same 
political party control both houses of Congress or having the same political party control 
the Senate and Presidency correlates with increased cost overruns for that year.  In their 
study on schedule growth, Drezner and Smith (1990) find that external guidance such as 
oversight reviews, legislation, and directives are associated with higher schedule growth. 
 
 
                                                 
9 Instead of evaluating SAR data for total program cost growth, Gounatidis examines annual cost growth 
reported in Cost Performance Reports (2006:43). 
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 Predictors from Space Studies 
 In addition to the quantitative DoD cost and schedule growth studies, several 
agencies have conducted qualitative analyses on cost growth among space systems.  
These qualitative studies agree that the main contributors to space system cost growth 
are: the increase in system requirements (requirements creep), the large number of Key 
Performance Parameters (KPPs), the short tenure of program managers (PMs), the lack of 
systems engineering expertise, the use of compressed schedules, the incorporation of 
immature technologies, and the use of Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR) 
contracts (Defense Science, 2003; Government, 2006; Salas, 2004). 
From these findings on predictors of cost growth, a disparity has emerged; while 
several of the factors identified by these qualitative studies (such as contract type and 
schedule characteristics) appear in the quantitative studies, most of the factors do not.  
What could be the cause of this disconnect?  Many of the quantitative studies take 
advantage of the data collected in the SAR, which limits their pool of predictor variables 
to those provided in the SAR.  Additionally, the predictors identified in the qualitative 
studies may be difficult to operationalize (that is, difficult to measure), such as systems 
engineering expertise.  However, many of the factors operationalize rather easily, such as 
the number of KPPs, the number (or growth) in requirements, the average tenure for 
PMs, and the maturity of technology.10  In these cases, data availability is most likely the 
reason that quantitative studies fail to incorporate these factors into their analyses. 
 
                                                 
10 The DoD uses a standard system to rate technology maturity, known as Technology Readiness Levels 
(TRLs) (Department, 2005).   
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Methodologies 
The literature review now turns to Investigative Question 4, “What are the current 
methodologies for predicting cost and schedule growth?”  The investigation provides 
valuable insight into understanding the variety of techniques employed by cost and 
schedule growth studies, which include case studies, graphical analyses, and regression 
analyses. 
Case Studies 
 In order to assess the state of acquisition for national security space programs, the 
Defense Science Board Task Force, led by Thomas Young, employs a qualitative 
approach.  The Young Task Force mainly relies upon interviews with government 
personnel, retired government personnel, and contractors.  Its interviews span a broad 
range of the acquisition spectrum: high-level decision makers from the Pentagon and 
AFSPC responsible for strategic planning; acquirers from SMC responsible for 
implementing daily acquisition duties; and contractors from Boeing Company, Lockheed 
Martin, and TRW responsible for designing and building space systems (Defense 
Science, 2003).  The Task Force augments its study with a more detailed examination of 
three high profile space systems: Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High, Future 
Imagery Architecture (FIA), and Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) (Defense 
Science, 2003).   
In its 2006 report on space system cost estimates, the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) utilizes a case study methodology involving detailed interviews with 
program office and contractor personnel as well as the examination of documentation on 
program cost and other program aspects.  In this study, GAO focuses on six programs: 
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Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite, EELV, Global Positioning 
System (GPS) IIF, National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 
(NPOESS), SBIRS High, and Wideband Gapfiller Satellite (Government, 2006). 
One of the main benefits of a case study is the ability to gain a depth of 
understanding of the particular program(s) being examined.  However, case studies are 
time consuming, costly, and limited by small sample size.  Additionally, they do not 
provide a quantitative measure of the relative contribution the predictors make to cost 
growth.  For example, both the Young Task Force (Defense Science, 2003) and the GAO 
(Government, 2006) studies identify requirements creep as a contributor to cost growth; 
however, because they are qualitative studies, they do not reveal how much cost growth 
can be attributed to requirements creep.  A quantitative study using regression analysis, 
on the other hand, would be able to forecast the percent increase in cost growth for each 
additional requirement (or for a given percent growth in requirements). 
Graphical Analyses 
Cost and schedule growth studies employ an assortment of methods for displaying 
data in graphical and tabular form.  Although these methods do not provide the reader 
with a quantitative measure of the relationship between the factor of interest and growth, 
they are an effective means of visually displaying data and identifying patterns.  One of 
the most common methods is the use of bar graphs and histograms, as shown by 
McCrillis (2003) in Figure 8.  In this graph, McCrillis divides total cost growth into 
increments of ten percent, and then displays the number of systems (frequency) that falls 
into each increment.  From this graph, the reader can gather that most systems experience 
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relatively little cost growth (between -10% and 20%).  Interestingly, a high number of 
systems experience extreme cost growth (greater than 70%). 
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Figure 8.  Total Cost Growth Distribution (McCrillis, 2003) 
 
 
Presenting comparisons in tabular form is another common method for conveying 
the relationship between a single factor and growth. In the case of Table 2, cost growth 
factors are displayed by weapon system type (commodity class).  Table 2 allows for 
quick comparisons; for example, electronics experience relatively low cost growth (CGF 
1.23), where as missiles experience relatively high cost growth (CGF 1.52).  Although 
displaying data in graphical and tabular form allows for quick identification of patterns 
and trends, this methodology limits the researcher’s ability to interpret the data.  Graphs 
and tables provide summaries of the data in the sample; however, they neither reveal 
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whether the relationships in the data are statistically significant nor do they provide the 
researcher with the ability to make predictions about the relationships in the population 
from which the data are drawn. 
 
 
Table 2.  Cost Growth Factor by Commodity Class (Arena et al., 2006) 
        
Commodity Mean Standard Deviation 
Number of 
Observations 
Aircraft 1.35 0.24 9 
Cruise missiles 1.64 0.40 4 
Electronic aircraft 1.52 0.47 5 
Electronics  1.23 0.33 12 
Helicopters 1.76 0.21 3 
Launch vehicles 2.30 N/A 1 
Missiles 1.52 0.38 8 
Other 1.40 N/A 1 
Satellites 1.55 0.57 2 
Vehicles 1.67 N/A 1 
    
 
 
 
 Regression Analyses 
The preferred quantitative methodology among DoD cost and schedule growth 
studies is regression analysis (Foreman, 2007; Gounatidis, 2006; McNicol, 2005; Tyson 
et al., 1994; Tyson et al., 1992a; Wolf, 1990).  DoD cost and schedule growth studies 
employ three types of regression analyses: simple linear regression, multiple regression, 
and logistic regression.  Simple linear regression quantitatively describes a linear 
relationship (Figure 9) between two variables: a single predictor variable (for example, 
size of program) and the response variable (cost growth).  It does so with a straight-line 
 41
equation that expresses the response variable (y) as a function of the predictor variable (x) 
(Schwab, 2005).  
 
 
 
However, simple linear regression limits the researcher to examining the effects 
of one variable at a time.  Because there are numerous possible predictors of cost or 
schedule growth, multiple regression is a more effective tool.  Multiple regression 
captures the relationship between multiple predictor variables and a response variable.  
With multiple regression, one can determine the relationship between a predictor variable 
and response variable while controlling for the effects of other predictor variables 
(Schwab, 2005).  For example, to examine the relationship between cost growth and 
acquiring service, one might create a simple linear regression model to predict cost 
growth based on service and find that Army programs correspond with higher cost 
growth.  However, if the Army programs in the dataset tend to be smaller than the Navy 
programs, this difference could be problematic, since Dameron et al.’s (2002) study finds 
that size impacts cost growth with smaller programs correlating with higher cost growth.  
Thus, the results are unclear as to whether Army programs correspond with higher cost 
Figure 9.  Linear Relationship 
y 
x 
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growth or smaller programs correspond with higher cost growth.  By using multiple 
regression, one can determine the relationship between service and cost growth while 
controlling for program size, thus resolving the dilemma faced by using simple linear 
regression. 
Another benefit to multiple regression is that the relationship between the 
predictor and response variables is not limited to a linear relationship; rather, multiple 
regression allows for non-linear relationships (McClave et al., 2005).  For example, if the 
relationship between cost growth and years of development increases initially and then 
decreases after a certain point, a quadratic model would be more appropriate (Figure 10). 
 
In addition to simple and multiple regression, a series of AFIT theses, beginning 
with Sipple (2002), also includes logistic regression in order to create models in which 
the response variable is binary (that is, the response has only two possible values).  In the 
case of these AFIT theses, the analyses use a two-stage process consisting of logistic and 
multiple regression.  First, logistic regression models are built from the entire dataset in 
order to predict whether or not a weapon system program is likely to experience cost or 
schedule growth (response value either “yes” or “no”).  Then, multiple regression models 
Figure 10.  Quadratic Relationship 
y 
x 
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are built from the portion of the dataset that experienced cost or schedule growth in order 
to predict how much growth will occur (Cross, 2006; Monaco, 2005; Genest, 2004; 
Lucas, 2004; McDaniel, 2004; Rossetti, 2004; Bielecki, 2003; Moore, 2003; Sipple, 
2002).  If the models were to simply use multiple regression for the entire dataset, a large 
portion of the data points would have values of zero.  This would result in a dilution in 
the predicted amount of growth as well as result in violation of some assumptions 
required for regression analyses, such as normality and constant variance for the residuals 
(the difference between the predicted and actual value) (Bielecki and White, 2005).  See 
Chapters III and IV for a more detailed discussion of logistic regression and residual 
analyses. 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter has reviewed previous cost and schedule growth studies examining 
all defense programs, as well as those that focus exclusively on space systems.  The 
literature review reveals that space system cost and schedule growth studies have been 
sparse and primarily qualitative, while quantitative studies analyzing cost and schedule 
growth for all defense programs have been numerous.  By reviewing the literature, this 
chapter has laid the foundation for answering four of the investigative questions: 
1. Which systems should be considered “space systems”? 
2. What are the current methods for calculating cost and schedule growth? 
3. What characteristics of the program or acquisition environment are good 
predictors of cost and schedule growth? 
4. What are the current methodologies for predicting cost and schedule growth? 
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With respect to Investigative Question 1, the literature reveals several definitions for 
“space system.”  The most restrictive definitions consider “space systems” to be only 
those systems operating in the space environment, such as satellites.  Broader definitions 
can include launch vehicles, space system ground equipment, and even strategic missiles.  
Limiting “space systems” to include only those operating in the space environment has 
the advantage of ensuring that one is comparing similar systems (“apples to apples”).  
However, by using the restrictive definition, researchers do not capture the entire system 
necessary for executing space missions.  If the focus is on the DoD space acquisition 
community, the restrictive definition does not capture all of the systems this community 
acquires since the DoD space acquisition community is responsible for acquiring not only 
space-based, but also land-based assets including strategic missiles. 
When exploring Investigative Question 2, cost and schedule growth studies 
provide two methods for calculating growth, as a percentage or as a growth factor.  For 
cost growth, the major differences in the calculations are not in the formulas, but rather in 
the definition of actual and estimated costs.  These differences include: how far along in 
development a program needs to be, which variances to include, and how to adjust for 
quantity. 
Investigative Question 3 provides valuable insight into predictors of cost and 
schedule growth.  Interestingly, for cost growth, the qualitative studies and the 
quantitative studies differ on the factors they considered and thus differ on which factors 
they find contribute most to cost growth.  The most likely cause of this disconnect is that 
quantitative studies often limit their predictor variables to those available in the SAR, and 
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many of the factors considered in qualitative studies are unlikely to be available for the 
large number of programs considered by quantitative studies. 
With respect to Investigative Question 4, the literature demonstrates a range of 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies for assessing the predictors, with each method 
having strengths and limitations.  Qualitative methods, such as case studies, provide the 
advantage of a depth of understanding into the programs being examined, but the small 
sample size limits the ability to generalize the results to other systems.  Quantitative 
methods, such as regression analysis, provide the advantage of statistical rigor and enable 
the researcher to numerically assess how much a predictor contributes to cost or schedule 
growth.  However, quantitative methods may be limited by available data, and thus 
unable to account for all factors contributing to space system cost or schedule growth. 
The literature reviewed herein contributes to this study by providing a greater 
understanding of how past researchers have defined space systems, calculated cost and 
schedule growth, identified predictors, and assessed those predictors.  This study builds 
upon this literature over the course of the next several chapters.  Chapter III presents this 
study’s definition of “space system,” method for calculating growth, and methodology 
for predicting space system cost and schedule growth.  Chapter IV incorporates the 
predictors identified by the literature to quantitatively assess which predictors are best for 
predicting space system cost and schedule growth. 
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III. Methodology and Data 
Chapter Overview 
This study defines “space systems” using the broadest definition: including not 
only satellites and spacecraft, but also launch vehicles, strategic missiles, and space-
related ground equipment.  This study uses two separate sets of data: Department of 
Defense (DoD) data and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) data.  
The DoD dataset includes satellites, launch vehicles, strategic missiles, and space-related 
ground equipment; the NASA dataset only includes spacecraft and satellites.  This 
chapter begins with the discussion of the methodology used by this study, and concludes 
with a discussion of each of the datasets.  Each dataset discussion details the data source, 
the response variables and how they are calculated, the potential predictor variables, and 
the diagnostics used to validate the models. 
Methodology 
 Figure 11 presents the methodology used in this study.  The methodology begins 
with collection of the data, proceeds to a preliminary and inferential analysis of the data, 
and concludes with interpreting the results. 
 Data Collection 
The literature review aids the data collection process by identifying potential 
predictor variables, as well as sources of data for previous studies.  In the case of this 
study, two separate datasets are compiled – one for DoD space systems and one for 
NASA space systems.  These datasets are kept separate due to the differences in the types 
of space systems included and the available data for the predictor variables. 
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 Figure 11.  Methodology Flow Chart 
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The primary source of data for DoD space systems is the Selected Acquisition 
Report (SAR) (Selected, 2003; “Selected,” 2007; “DAMIR,” 2007).  As discussed in 
Chapter II, the SAR includes cost, schedule, and programmatic information for Major 
Defense Acquisition Programs.  The DoD dataset consists of data for 21 programs 
including satellites, launch vehicles, missiles, and ground equipment.  See DoD data 
discussion herein for more detailed information regarding the data used in this study. 
The NASA dataset combines data from two previous cost growth studies: the 
1992 Institute for Defense Analyses study (Tyson et al., 1992a) and the 2004 NASA 
Headquarters Cost Analysis Division study (Schaffer, 2004).  Additional data were added 
to this dataset based on publicly available online NASA sources including National Space 
Science Data Center (“NSSDC,” 2007), JPL Mission and Space Craft Library (“MSL,” 
2007), and NASA’s Science Mission Directorate (“Science,” 2007).  Personal 
communications with program personnel provided additional data.  The NASA dataset 
includes cost, schedule, and descriptive data for 71 satellites and spacecraft.  The 
availability of schedule data for 47 of these systems allows for this study to include an 
analysis of schedule growth in addition to cost growth.  See NASA data discussion herein 
for more detailed information regarding the data used in this study. 
 After compiling the data into their respective datasets, the data go through a 
rigorous “data scrub.”  This data scrub includes analyses on individual variables to ensure 
that all of the values have been entered correctly and all calculated fields are correctly 
tabulated.  Additionally, the data scrub identifies any unusual patterns or observations 
within a particular variable.  For example, Figure 12 displays a histogram of the cost 
growth values for the DoD space systems.  As can be seen, there is an outlier that has 
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three times the cost growth of the next highest observation.  This observation is noted and 
may be removed later on if it unduly influences the models. 
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In addition to identifying single points that are unusual, the data scrub also identifies 
unusual patterns, such as distributions that appear bimodal11 rather than normal.  Unusual 
patterns may indicate the need to create additional variables to capture these patterns.  
See the discussion herein on the NASA response variables, for details on creating logistic 
response variables to capture bimodal distributions. 
Preliminary Analysis 
The cost and schedule growth analysis begins with the use of graphical 
descriptive methods.  These methods compare the cost/schedule growth response variable 
to a single predictor variable using bar charts to compare means. After identifying 
potential patterns, the Preliminary Analysis uses Student’s t-tests to determine the 
statistical significance of these relationships.  Correlation analyses are also used to 
                                                 
11 Bimodal distributions have two distinct modes (that is, two relative maximum values).  Such a 
distribution may represent two separate distributions. 
Figure 12.  Histogram of DoD Cost Growth  
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identify relationships between predictor variables.  See Chapter IV for the Preliminary 
Analysis and more information on the analytical techniques used. 
Inferential Analysis 
Simple Regressions.  The inferential statistical analysis begins with performing 
simple regressions.  For each response variable, each predictor variable is regressed 
against it individually to determine which predictors are the best indicators of cost or 
schedule growth.  This consists of several dozen regressions for each response variable. 
Preliminary Model.  Those predictor variables that are significant at the 5% level 
represent the main drivers for that response variable and are carried forward to the 
preliminary model.  Based on the correlation analysis from the Preliminary Analysis, if 
two predictors are highly correlated, then only the predictor that was more predictive (in 
terms of significance level) is carried forward.  The preliminary model combines all non-
correlated significant predictor variables into a single model. 
Preliminary Model Diagnostics.  In order to validate the models, the preliminary 
model undergoes numerous diagnostic tests.  For linear regression models, this includes 
comparing the R2 and adjusted R2, using Cook’s Distance to identify influential data 
points, testing the studentized residuals for normality using the Shapiro-Wilk Test, and 
testing the residuals for constant variance using the Breusch-Pagan test.  For logistic 
models, diagnostics include assessing the R2 (U), studying the ROC Curve, and 
comparing the Wald and Likelihood Ratio Parameter Estimates to identify unstable 
variables.  If the diagnostics reveal that the model is sound, then the model proceeds to 
the refinement stage.  If the diagnostics reveal that the model is not sound, the individual 
variables are revisited for adjustment.  This could include removal of influential data 
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points, transformations (such as logarithmic) of the response or predictor variables, 
identification of new predictor variables, or transforming a variable from a continuous 
variable to a discrete variable. 
Model Refinement.  In order to identify the most predictive model(s), the 
preliminary model undergoes an iterative process of running hundreds of regressions by 
adding and removing the remaining predictor variables individually and in groups to 
determine if the addition or removal of such variables adds value to the model.  
Refinement also includes testing for interaction terms and higher-order terms, such as 
quadratics.  These new models are evaluated against the preliminary model and each 
other by comparing the R2 and adjusted R2 for linear regression models and by comparing 
the R2 (U) and using the Likelihood Ratio tests for logistic models. 
Refined Model Diagnostics.  In order to validate the refined models, these models 
undergo the same diagnostics as the preliminary models.  If the diagnostics reveal that the 
model is theoretically sound, the most predictive model(s) are established as the final 
model(s).  Otherwise, the data or methodology goes through additional adjustments.  See 
Chapter IV for the final models. 
Results 
After establishing the final models, the analysis proceeds to an interpretation of 
the models and associated predictor variables.  See Chapter V for the discussion of the 
results, limitations to the results, and recommendations for further study. 
DoD Space Systems Dataset 
The DoD dataset uses information annually reported to Congress through the 
SAR.  The 21 space programs included in this dataset are satellites, launch vehicles, 
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strategic missiles, and space-related ground equipment reported in SARs between 1969 
and 2006 (see Appendix A for a complete list of the space systems).  The dataset includes 
total costs of all variance categories (with the adjustments described herein) for both 
development and procurement costs associated with the development phase of system 
acquisition (Phase B: Design Phase, see Figures 3 and 4 in Chapter I).  Like most studies 
using SAR data, this study uses a mix of completed and on-going programs. To ensure 
enough cost data were available for each program, this study follows the example of 
McNichol (2005) by setting a minimum requirement that a program had to have reported 
SARs for at least three years in order to qualify for inclusion. 
It is important to recognize that using SAR data has a number of drawbacks, 
primarily due to the nature of the reporting process.  Hough (1992) notes a number of 
limitations from using data from the SAR including: 
• Programs do not always use a consistent baseline for the cost estimates 
• Not all elements of cost are included 
• Certain classes of programs, such as special access programs, are not included 
• Guidelines for preparing SARs change over time 
• Differences exist in the interpretation of preparation guidelines 
• Some programs account for risk by including reserve funds in cost estimates 
• Inconsistencies exist in reporting for programs that share costs between services 
• Cost changes are reported in terms of their effects rather than root causes 
While recognizing these limitations, this study chooses to use SAR data because it does 
provide a significant amount of consistency in the type of data that is collected and the 
format in which that data is available. 
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DoD Response Variables 
The DoD response variables include Total Cost Growth and Per Unit Cost 
Growth.  Due to the inconsistency in records of schedule data, this analysis does not 
include an assessment of DoD space system schedule growth. 
Total Cost Growth.  The Total Cost Growth response variable compares the actual 
or most current estimate (CE) to the original development estimate (DE) from the 
initiation of Milestone B.  The CE is adjusted for quantity changes by subtracting the cost 
growth listed in the Quantity Variance category.  Both the DE and CE are adjusted for 
inflation by converting both into Constant Year 2007 (CY07) dollars.  Cost Growth is 
then calculated using Equation 3, which provides Cost Growth in terms of a percentage, 
where a value of “zero” means there is no cost growth, a negative value means that the 
actual cost (CE) is less than the planned costs (DE), and a positive value means that the 
actual cost (CE) is greater than the planned cost (DE). 
 
Cost Growth  =   (CE-DE)           (3) 
DE 
  
Since military cost growth studies and current defense acquisition policies are 
inconsistent as to whether or not strategic missiles are treated as space systems, this study 
is interested in analyzing the defense data both with and without inclusion of these 
systems.  Figure 13 shows the histogram for the 21 programs in the DoD dataset.  The 
histogram reveals the degree to which the data for the response variable represents a 
normal distribution.  Although normality is not required, tests on preliminary models 
from this dataset reveal that the lack of normality for this distribution leads to numerous 
problems with the residual diagnostics, and thus this lack of normality prevents adequate 
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modeling of this variable.  Using the Shapiro-Wilk Test to assess the normality of the 
distribution yields a p-value of <0.0001.  Since this is well below the 0.05 level of 
significance, the test rejects the null hypothesis that the data are from a normal 
distribution.  As can be seen visually from Figure 13, a single point (Titan IV) clearly 
prevents this distribution from being a normal distribution.   
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Omitting this single observation (Figure 14), improves the distribution’s Shapiro-Wilk 
Test p-value to 0.0092; however, this value is still too low, thus rejecting that the data are 
from a normal distribution.  Even with the removal of Titan IV, preliminary models 
continue to have numerous problems with residual diagnostics.  Thus, the data are unable 
to be sufficiently analyzed in the current form. 
Figure 13.  Histogram of DoD Total Cost Growth 
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Since analysis of space systems excluding strategic missiles is also of interest, the 
analysis tests the data excluding these observations to see if normality is still an issue.  
Figure 15, displays the histogram for Total Cost Growth after removing Titan IV and the 
five strategic missile observations.  This distribution’s Shapiro-Wilk Test p-value is 
0.0542, thus failing to reject that the data are from a normal distribution.  Although 
borderline, this is a significant improvement, and this dataset of 15 points is carried 
forward into the analysis for Total Cost Growth.  Thus, in the case of Total Cost Growth, 
the analysis focuses only on space systems excluding strategic missiles.   
Figure 14.  Histogram of DoD Total Cost Growth, 
Titan IV omitted  
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Per Unit Cost Growth.  Similar to the Total Cost Growth response variable, the 
Per Unit Cost Growth response variable compares the actual or most current estimate 
(CE) to the original development estimate (DE), adjusted for inflation into CY07 dollars.  
The Per Unit Cost Growth response variable accounts for changes in quantity by 
adjusting both the DE and the CE into a per unit cost, using Equation 4: 
Per Unit     =     [(CE/# of unit for CE)-(DE/# of units for DE)]        (4) 
Cost Growth  DE/# of units for DE  
Figure 16 displays the Per Unit Cost Growth response variable using all 21 observations 
(includes strategic missiles).  Visually, the graph appears normal, and it has a Shapiro-
Wilk Test p-value of 0.4811, well above the 0.05 level of significance, thus failing to 
reject that the data are normally distributed. 
Figure 15.  Histogram of DoD Total Cost Growth, 
Excluding strategic missiles and Titan IV 
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Recognizing the utility of a model that excludes strategic missiles, the study also 
considers the data without the inclusion of these systems.  Figure 17 displays the Per Unit 
Cost Growth response variable excluding the strategic missile observations.  Visually, 
this graph also appears normal, and it has a Shapiro-Wilk Test p-value of 0.7052, thus 
failing to reject that the data are normally distributed.  Thus, the Per Unit Cost Growth 
response variable is carried forward for analysis using both versions (with and without 
strategic missiles).  
Figure 16.  Histogram of DoD Per Unit Cost Growth 
 58
-1 -0.5 0 .5 1 1.5 2
 
 
DoD Predictor Variables 
The study assesses the predictor variables to determine which characteristics are 
indicators of cost growth.  Some of these, such as Commodity Type, have been used in 
past quantitative cost growth studies, others such as Program Manager Tenure are 
inspired by the qualitative space studies, and others such as Mission Type are new 
additions. 
Commodity Type.  This predictor captures the commodity classification of the 
particular program.  The attribute is represented in the dataset by three separate binary 
variables: Satellite, Launch Vehicle/Missile, and Ground Equipment.  In each case, the 
variable is assigned a value of “1” if the system belongs to that category and a value of 
“0” otherwise. 
Mission Area.  This attribute captures the type of mission for the program (note 
that a program may belong to more than one mission area).  As with Commodity Type, 
Mission Area is measured by four separate binary variables: Communications, 
Figure 17.  Histogram of DoD Per Unit Cost Growth 
Excluding strategic missiles 
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Navigation, Earth Observation (such as visual or infrared scanning), and Space Support 
(those systems that perform a significant portion of their mission on land, such as launch 
vehicles, strategic missiles, and ground equipment).  In each case, the variable is assigned 
a value of “1” if the system belongs to that category and a value of “0” otherwise. 
Program Size.  This attribute is a continuous variable measured in terms of actual 
system cost in CY07 dollars.  As discussed in the literature review, some studies have 
found that smaller programs are associated with higher cost growth. 
Development Duration.  This is a continuous variable measuring the number of 
years between the first development estimate and the last development estimate included 
in the study.  As discussed in the literature review, studies have found that those 
programs with longer development periods (or programs further along in their 
development) are associated with higher cost growth.  Due to the inconsistency in records 
of schedule data, it was not possible to include other schedule variables. 
Program Managers.  Qualitative DoD space systems studies identified high 
rotation of Program Managers as a contributor to space system cost growth.  Thus, two 
Program Manager variables have been included: # of PMs and PM Tenure.  # of PMs is a 
discrete variable measuring the number of Program Managers during the system’s 
development phase, while PM Tenure is a continuous variable measuring the average 
tenure of a Program Manager, calculated by dividing the Development Duration by the # 
of PMs. 
Baselines.  Adjusting the baseline is an indication of major program restructuring.  
Thus, two baseline variables have been included to attempt to capture major 
programmatic changes.  The first, # of Baselines is a discrete variable measuring the 
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number of baselines for the system.  The second, Baselines/yr is a continuous variable 
measuring the number of baselines adjusted for length of the development, calculated by 
dividing the # of Baselines by the Development Duration. 
Contract Type.  This attribute captures the type of contracts that were used in the 
development of the program.  It is measured by two separate binary variables: Cost Plus 
Award Fee (CPAF) and Firm Fixed Price (FFP).  In each case, the variable is assigned a 
value of “1” if the system belongs to that category and a value of “0” otherwise.  Note 
that there are other contract types available, but these two are the most widely used for 
the programs in the DoD dataset.  Many programs use multiple contract types for various 
portions of development.  Thus, it is feasible for a program to have both a CPAF and a 
FFP contract or to have neither. 
Lead Service: Air Force.  This is a binary variable with a value of “1” if the 
system was developed by the Air Force and a value of “0” otherwise. 
Cost Breach.  This is a binary variable with a value of “1” if the system 
experienced a cost breach [cost exceeded 10% of objective cost reported in the 
Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) (Axtell and Irby, 2007)] during development and a 
value of “0” otherwise. 
Schedule Breach.  This is a binary variable with a value of “1” if the system 
experienced a schedule breach [schedule exceeded 6 months from objective schedule 
reported in the APB (Axtell and Irby, 2007)] during development and a value of “0” 
otherwise. 
Prime Contractor.  This attribute is measured by four separate binary variables: 
Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, and Other Contractor.  In each case, the 
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variable is assigned a value of “1” if the system was developed by that contractor (or one 
of that contractor’s predecessors) and a value of “0” otherwise.  Note that in some cases, 
a system may have multiple prime contractors. 
NASA Space Systems Dataset 
The NASA dataset includes data compiled from the 1992 Institute for Defense 
Analyses study (Tyson et al., 1992a); the 2004 NASA Headquarters Cost Analysis 
Division study (Schaffer, 2004); publicly available online NASA sources including 
National Space Science Data Center (“NSSDC,” 2007), JPL Mission and Space Craft 
Library (“MSL,” 2007), and NASA’s Science Mission Directorate (“Science,” 2007); as 
well as data collected through personal communications with program personnel.  The 
NASA dataset includes cost, schedule, and descriptive data for 71 satellites and 
spacecraft from 1964 to 2004.  The cost data includes total development costs through the 
launch of the spacecraft.  Unlike the DoD dataset which includes both completed and on-
going programs, all 71 NASA programs have completed development and been launched.  
See Appendix B for a complete list of the NASA programs used in this study.  Since 
initial launch estimates and actual launch dates were available for 47 of the programs in 
the NASA dataset, the response variables include both cost and schedule growth. 
NASA Response Variables 
NASA Cost Growth.  Similar to the DoD cost growth response variables, the 
NASA Cost Growth response variable compares actual development costs to the initial 
estimate in terms of a percentage, using Equation 5.  The estimate and actual costs are 
adjusted for inflation by converting both into Constant Year 2007 (CY07) dollars.  
Because NASA programs tend to be formulated around the development of a single 
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system, with each spacecraft considered a separate program, quantity adjustments are not 
required. 
 
Cost Growth   =   (Actual-Estimate)           (5) 
         Estimate 
 
The histogram (Figure 18) of NASA Cost Growth reveals that a number of data 
points fall at the high end of the distribution, which may cause the data to not represent a 
normal distribution.  Testing for normality using the Shapiro-Wilk Test, provides a p-
value of <0.0001.  Since p-values less than 0.05 lead to the rejection of the null 
hypothesis that the data is from a normal distribution, it is suspected that the values at the 
high end of the NASA Cost Growth data represent a separate distribution. 
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Thus, the NASA Cost Growth distribution is divided into two distributions: low 
Cost Growth (consisting of 62 observations) and high Cost Growth (consisting of 9 
observations).  After removing the high cost growth programs, the histogram for low 
Figure 18.  Histogram of Cost Growth  
 response variable for NASA systems 
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Cost Growth (Figure 19) reveals a normal distribution with a Shapiro-Wilk Test p-value 
of 0.7143.  Since this is greater than 0.05, the Shapiro-Wilk Test fails to reject the null 
hypothesis that the data is from the normal distribution. 
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Due to the small sample size (n = 9), it is unclear from a visual examination of the 
histogram for high Cost Growth (Figure 20) whether these values represent a normal 
distribution.  Fortunately, the Shapiro-Wilk Test was designed for small sample sizes; 
Shapiro and Wilk (1965) originally designed the test for 2 < n < 50, and the test has been 
shown to be robust for samples n < 2000 (“JMP®”, 2005; Arthur and Seber, 1984).   
Testing the distribution of the high Cost Growth programs for normality results in a 
Shapiro-Wilk p-value of 0.3468; since this is greater than 0.05, the Shapiro-Wilk Test 
fails to reject the null hypothesis that the data is from the normal distribution. Given that 
the full NASA Cost Growth distribution did not pass the test for normality, but the 
division of it provides two distributions that do pass the test for normality, it is concluded 
Figure 19.  Histogram of low Cost Growth  
 response variable for NASA systems 
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that the NASA Cost Growth response represents a bimodal distribution.  Thus, in order to 
model cost growth for NASA space systems, it is best to separately model low Cost 
Growth and high Cost Growth. 
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 Adapting from the technique implemented by Sipple (2002), this study employs 
logistic regression to determine whether or not a program is likely to experience high cost 
growth using the binary variable High Cost Growth? with a value “1” for high cost 
growth programs and a value of “0” for low cost growth programs.  Logistic regression 
uses maximum likelihood to estimate the parameters that best model the data, creating a 
likelihood function that expresses the probability (as a value between 0 and 1) that the 
independent variables predict the dependent variable.  For our purposes, a probability 
greater than or equal to 0.5 (50%) predicts a program will experience high cost growth, 
and a probability of less than 0.5 predicts the program will not experience high cost 
growth.  See Sipple (2002) for more information on the logistic response function.  
Figure 20.  Histogram of high Cost Growth  
 response variable for NASA systems 
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Thus, the first response variable, High Cost Growth?, is a binary variable 
measuring the likelihood that a program will experience high cost growth.  The second 
response variable, Cost Growth, is a continuous variable that measures the percentage of 
cost growth that a program is likely to incur.  Because the NASA Cost Growth response 
represents a bimodal distribution, the analysis models this variable twice, once for each 
distribution, thus providing a High Cost Growth Linear Regression Model and a Low 
Cost Growth Linear Regression Model. 
Schedule Growth.  The Schedule Growth response variable compares the planned 
launch date to the actual launch date for 47 NASA space systems.  Both dates are 
measured in the number of months they occur from program initiation.  As with Cost 
Growth, Schedule Growth is calculated as a percentage using Equation 6. 
 
Schedule Growth   =    (Actual Launch Schedule - Planned Launch Schedule)        (6) 
     Planned Launch Schedule 
 
Similar to Cost Growth, the histogram of Schedule Growth (Figure 21) does not 
appear to represent the normal distribution.  The Shapiro-Wilk Test rejects the null 
hypothesis that the data are from the normal distribution with a p-value of <0.0001. 
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Using the same methodology as with Cost Growth, the Schedule Growth 
distribution is divided into two, to see if it represents a bimodal distribution.  Figures 22 
and 23 provide the histograms for low Schedule Growth (36 observations) and high 
Schedule Growth (11 observations), respectively.  Using the Shapiro-Wilk Test, both 
distributions fail to reject the null hypothesis that the distributions represent a normal 
distribution, with a p-value of 0.0842 for low Schedule Growth and a p-value of 0.0504 
for high Schedule Growth. 
Figure 21.  Histogram of Schedule Growth  
 response variable for NASA systems 
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Thus, this study models NASA Schedule Growth in the same manner as NASA 
Cost Growth, by first using a binary response variable, High Schedule Growth?, to 
determine whether or not the program is likely to experience high schedule growth.  
Figure 22.  Histogram of low Schedule Growth  
 response variable for NASA systems 
Figure 23.  Histogram of high Schedule Growth  
 response variable for NASA systems 
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Then, the study uses a continuous response variable, Schedule Growth, to separately 
model high and low Schedule Growth programs. 
NASA Predictor Variables 
The study assesses a number of predictor variables to determine which 
characteristics are indicators of cost or schedule growth.  The predictors include 
programs size, program start, schedule (for cost growth response), cost growth (for 
schedule growth response), mission area, international participation, developer, life span, 
and mass. 
Program Size.  There are two program size variables: Initial Program Size and 
Final Program Size.  Initial Program Size is a continuous variable measured in terms of 
the original estimate of the system cost in CY07 dollars.  Final Program Size is a 
continuous variable measured in terms of actual system cost in CY07 dollars.  As 
discussed in the literature review, some studies have found that smaller programs are 
associated with higher cost growth. 
 Program Start.  This is a continuous variable measured as the number of years 
from 1964 (this year was chosen as the baseline since it represents the earliest start date 
in the dataset). 
 Schedule Characteristics.  There are three schedule predictor variables: Estimated 
Time to Launch, Actual Time to Launch, and Schedule Growth.  Estimated Time to 
Launch is a continuous variable measuring the initial planned launch date in number of 
months from program initiation.  Actual Time to Launch is a continuous variable 
measuring the actual launch date in number of months from program initiation.  Schedule 
Growth is a continuous variable measuring the percent growth between the estimated and 
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actual launch schedule: (actual date – planned date)/planned date.  The schedule predictor 
variables are used with the cost growth response variables only. 
 Cost Growth.  % Cost Growth is a continuous variable measuring the percent 
growth between the estimated and actual cost (See Equation 6).  The % Cost Growth 
predictor variable is used with the schedule growth response variables only. 
 Mission Area.  This attribute captures the type of mission for the program as 
catalogued in the National Space Science Data Center database (“NSSDC,” 2007).  
Mission area is measured by ten binary variables: Space Physics, Engineering, Earth 
Science, Planetary Science, Astronomy, Solar Physics, Human Crew, Communications, 
Life Science, and Microgravity.  In each case, the variable is assigned a value of “1” if the 
system belongs to that category and a value of “0” otherwise.  Note that a program may 
have more than one mission area.   
 International Participation.  This is a binary variable capturing whether or not 
countries other than the U.S. participated in the scientific, technical, or design elements 
of the spacecraft.  The variable is assigned a value of “1” if the system included 
international participation and a value of “0” otherwise. 
 Developer.  This attribute measures the primary organization responsible for 
designing and manufacturing the spacecraft.  It is measured by nine binary variables: 
NASA, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, 
Northrop Grumman, DoD,12 International Developer, and Other Developer.  In each 
                                                 
12 Two DoD programs, DSCS-2 and SCATHA are included in the NASA dataset.  A number of NASA 
databases have included the cost, schedule, and technical data of these programs due to their similarity to 
other NASA programs. 
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case, the variable is assigned a value of “1” if the system was developed by that 
organization and a value of “0” otherwise. 
Life Span.  There are two life span predictor variables: Design Life and Actual 
Life.  Design Life is a continuous variable measuring the intended design life of the 
spacecraft in months.  Actual Life is a continuous variable measuring the actual life span, 
or current estimate of the life span for programs still in operation, in months. 
Mass.  There are two mass predictor variables: Total Mass and Dry Mass.  Total 
Mass is a continuous variable measuring the total mass of the spacecraft in kilograms, 
including consumable propellants, at the time of launch.  Dry Mass is a continuous 
variable measuring the mass of the spacecraft in kilograms, excluding consumable 
propellants, at the time of launch. 
Chapter Summary 
 This chapter discussed the methodology and data used by this study to predict 
cost and schedule growth for space systems.  The methodology includes collecting and 
reviewing the data, performing preliminary analyses, performing inferential analyses, and 
then interpreting the results. 
The DoD dataset includes cost and programmatic data for 21 space-related 
programs from 1969 through 2006, including satellites, launch vehicles, strategic 
missiles, and ground equipment.  From this dataset, two response variables have been 
identified: Total Cost Growth and Per Unit Cost Growth.  Additionally, the study 
identified a number of programmatic characteristics as potential predictors of cost 
growth.  Chapter IV includes the Preliminary Analysis and Inferential Analysis for both 
of these responses. 
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The NASA dataset includes cost, schedule, and descriptive data for 71 satellites 
and spacecraft from 1964 to 2004.  From this dataset, two response variables have been 
identified: Cost Growth and Schedule Growth.  Due to the bimodal distribution of these 
two variables, the analysis begins by using logistic regression to determine whether or not 
the program is likely to experience high growth and then employs separate linear 
regressions for high and low growth to predict the quantity of growth.  As with the DoD 
dataset, the NASA dataset discussion includes identifying programmatic characteristics 
that are potential predictors of cost and schedule growth.  Chapter IV includes the 
Preliminary Analysis and Inferential Analysis for both of these responses. 
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IV. Analysis 
Chapter Overview 
 As discussed in the Methodology section of Chapter III, the analysis consists of 
two segments: the Preliminary Analysis and the Inferential Analysis.  This chapter begins 
by detailing the Preliminary Analysis for the Department of Defense (DoD) data set, 
followed by the Preliminary Analysis for the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) dataset.  The Preliminary Analysis compares response values for 
individual predictor variables, as well as identifies potential relationships between 
predictor variables.  The chapter then details the Inferential Analysis, beginning with the 
DoD dataset and concluding with the NASA dataset.  The Inferential Analysis includes 
logistic and linear regression models useful for predicting cost and schedule growth. 
Preliminary Analysis 
 The Preliminary Analysis includes graphical analyses, Student’s t-tests (t-test), 
and correlation analyses for select predictor variables.  The graphical analyses include bar 
graphs of mean (average) growth values by predictor variable in order to identify 
potential predictors.  Because examining solely the mean values amongst groups can be 
misleading, the Preliminary Analysis includes performing t-tests to determine if the 
differences in the means are significant.  The Preliminary Analysis also includes 
correlation analyses between predictor variables to allow for the identification of 
multicollinearity13 issues.  The discussion herein details only those tests with significant 
results. 
                                                 
13 Multicollinearity occurs when two or more predictor variables are intercorreltated.  When two highly 
correlated predictors are used in a regression model, they create linear redundancy in the model and 
diminish the accuracy of the regression coefficients (Gujarat, 1995:320-322). 
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 Preliminary Analysis: DoD 
 Total Cost Growth.  The study performed preliminary analyses for the Program 
Manager Tenure, Contractor, Commodity Type, Mission Area, and Program Size 
predictor variables, using all 21 programs in the DoD dataset. 
 Figure 24 displays average Total Cost Growth by prime contractor: Lockheed 
Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, and other contractors.  From the graph, it appears 
that programs developed by Lockheed Martin experience higher cost growth than other 
prime contractors.  Using a one-tailed t-test to test the alternate hypothesis of unequal 
means results in a p-value of 0.0925, therefore programs developed by Lockheed Martin 
do experience higher cost growth than the other three contractor categories at the 
significance level of 10%, but these results are not significant at the 5% level. 
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 Figure 24.  DoD Total Cost Growth by Prime Contractor 
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 Figure 25 displays Total Cost Growth by Commodity Type.  From viewing the 
graph, it appears that ground equipment has the lowest cost growth and launch 
vehicles/missiles have the highest cost growth.  A one-tailed t-test for ground equipment 
results in a p-value of 0.0262, well below a 5% significance level; however, the one-
tailed t-test for launch vehicles/missiles fails to reject the null hypothesis of equal means 
with a p-value of 0.2063.  Thus, ground equipment systems have statistically significant 
lower cost growth than other systems. 
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Figure 26 displays Total Cost Growth by Mission Area.  Visual examination leads 
to the alternate hypothesis that communications missions have lower cost growth than 
other missions.  A one-tailed t-test for communications missions results in a p-value of 
0.0447, thus rejecting the null hypothesis of equal means.  Thus, systems with 
Figure 25.  DoD Total Cost Growth by Commodity Type 
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communications missions have statistically significant lower cost growth than other 
systems. 
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Per Unit Cost Growth.  As with Total Cost Growth, the preliminary analyses 
assessed Per Unit Cost Growth using all 21 programs in the DoD dataset.  Figure 27 
displays Per Unit Cost Growth by Commodity Type.  Similar to Total Cost Growth, it 
appears that ground equipment has lower per unit cost growth.  A one-tailed t-test for 
ground equipment rejects the null hypothesis with a p-value of 0.0074, well below a 5% 
or even 1% significance level.  Thus, ground equipment systems have statistically 
significant lower per unit cost growth than other systems.  
 
Figure 26.  DoD Total Cost Growth by Mission Area 
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Figure 28 displays Per Unit Cost Growth by Mission Area.  Visual examination 
leads to the alternate hypothesis that earth observation missions have higher per unit cost 
growth than other missions.  However, a one-tailed t-test for earth observation missions 
results in a p-value of 0.1089, just barely failing to reject the null hypothesis at the 10% 
level. 
 
Figure 27.  DoD Per Unit Cost Growth by Commodity Type 
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 Predictor Correlations.  The Preliminary Analysis also includes performing 
correlation analysis on the predictor variables in the DoD dataset in order to identify any 
variables that may exhibit similar behaviors, and thus lead to multicollinearity issues.  If 
two predictors are highly correlated, using both in a model can create linear redundancy 
and diminish the accuracy of the regression coefficients (Gujarat, 1995:320-322).  
Franzblau (1958) identifies correlations values between 0.60 and 0.80 (or between -0.60 
and -0.80) as having a “marked degree of correlation” and values between 0.80 and 1.00 
(or between -0.80 and -1.00) as having a “high correlation.”  Table 3 provides correlation 
values for those predictor variables that have correlations greater than 0.6 or less than      
-0.6. 
Figure 28.  DoD Per Unit Cost Growth by Mission Area 
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Table 3.  Correlations between DoD Predictor Variables 
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# of PMs 1.00 0.92 0.73 0.86   0.65  
Development 
Duration 
 1.00 0.71 0.82   0.63  
Cost Breach   1.00 0.66     
# of Baselines    1.00   0.73  
Launch 
Vehicle/Missile 
    1.00 -0.60   
Satellite      1.00  -1.00 
Navigation       1.00  
Space Support        1.00 
 
 
 In the case of the # of Program Managers, Development Duration, Cost Breach, 
and # of Baselines, time is most likely the underlying factor that ties these variables 
together; that is, programs that have had longer development periods would be expected 
to have higher values for each of these.  During the regression analysis, if two highly 
correlated variables were to both appear significant, then including both would cause 
linear redundancy in the analysis.  In this case, the variable that is most predictive (in 
terms of significance level) is kept in the model. 
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Preliminary Analysis: NASA 
 The study includes preliminary analyses for cost and schedule growth with the 
Mission Area, Developer, Program Size, and spacecraft Mass variables.  The cost 
analyses used all 71 programs in which cost data were available, and the schedule 
analyses used all 47 programs in which schedule data were available.  The discussion 
herein details those tests with significant results. 
 NASA Cost Growth.  Figure 29 displays average Cost Growth by Developer.  
Note that while the average cost growth for DoD programs is far greater than for the 
other developer categories, this dataset only includes two DoD programs.  A one-tailed t-
test for the alternate hypothesis that DoD programs have higher cost growth fails to reject 
the null hypothesis with a p-value of 0.1591.  However, a one-tailed t-test for the 
alternate hypothesis that programs developed by Johns Hopkins have lower cost growth 
rejects the null hypothesis with a p-value of 0.0419, and a similar test for NASA 
developed programs is significant at the 10% level with a p-value of 0.0893.  Thus, 
systems developed by Johns Hopkins have statistically significant lower cost growth than 
other systems at the 5% level, and systems developed by NASA have statistically 
significant lower cost growth than other systems at the 10% level. 
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Schedule Growth.  Figure 30 displays average Schedule Growth by Developer.  
From this figure, it appears that Johns Hopkins, Boeing, and Other Developer are 
associated with low schedule growth and NASA, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Northrop 
Grumman, and International Developer are associated with high schedule growth.  One-
tailed t-tests on these variables find that these relationships are significant for: Johns 
Hopkins with a p-value of <0.0001, Boeing with a p-value of 0.0112, Northrop Grumman 
with a p-value of 0.0826, and Other Developer with a p-value of 0.0242.  Thus, systems 
developed by Johns Hopkins, Boeing, and Other Developers have statistically significant 
lower cost growth than other systems, and systems developed by Northrop Grumman 
have statistically significant higher cost growth than other systems. 
Figure 29.  NASA Cost Growth by Developer 
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Predictor Correlations.  Correlation analysis was preformed on the predictor 
variables in the NASA dataset in order to identify any variables that may exhibit similar 
behaviors.  Table 4 provides only those correlations that are greater than 0.6 or less than -
0.6.  As with the DoD predictor correlations, if two highly correlated variables both 
appear significant during the regression analysis, then the variable that is most predictive 
(in terms of significance level) is kept in the model. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 30.  NASA Schedule Growth by Developer 
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Table 4.  Correlations between NASA Predictor Variables 
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Inferential Analysis: DoD 
 Total Cost Growth 
 As discussed in Chapter III, due to the non-normality of the distribution when 
including all of the systems in the DoD dataset, the Total Cost Growth analysis excludes 
strategic missiles and Titan IV.  The remaining 15 systems include all satellites, other 
launch vehicles, and all space-related ground equipment.  Equation 7 provides the final 
model for predicting Total Cost Growth using the methodology outlined in Chapter III: 
   CGT = 0.715 – 0.577*(Communications)              (7) 
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where CGT is the dependent variable and is the predicted Total Cost Growth as a 
percentage of the system’s original estimate, and Communications is a binary variable 
with a value of “1” for those systems with a communications mission and a value of “0” 
otherwise.  The negative coefficient on the Communications variable indicates that those 
systems with a communications mission experience lower cost growth than compared to 
other missions.  To assess the ability of the parameter in the model to explain the 
variation in the response, the analysis examines both the R2 and the adjusted R2.14  The R2 
for this model is 0.29 and the adjusted R2 is 0.24.  The relatively low values of the R2 and 
the adjusted R2 indicate that much of the variation in Total Cost Growth is explained by 
factors outside of the model.  Appendix C provides the complete output provided by the 
JMP Software (JMP®, 2005) for this regression. 
The analysis applies numerous diagnostics to the model in order to test its 
robustness.  The first diagnostic is the Cook’s Distance test for influential data points.  
With this test, values over 0.5 indicate possible influential data points (Neter et al., 
1996:381).  The Cook’s Distance for the Total Cost Growth model had all points below 
0.3, thus indicating that there are no influential data points present.  The second 
diagnostic tests the studentized residuals for normality using the Shapiro-Wilk Test.  
With this test, a p-value below 0.05 rejects the null hypothesis that the residuals are 
normally distributed.  Since the optimal model will have normally distributed studentized 
                                                 
14 R2 and adjusted R2 range from “0” to “1,” where a value of “1” indicates that the parameters explain 
100% of the variation of the response, and a value of “0” indicates that the parameters provide no 
explanation.  Since an increase in the number of variables will result in an increase in the R2, the adjusted 
R2 is also referenced because it accounts for the number of predictor variables used in the model.  Thus, 
while a saturated model (one with unnecessary predictor variables) may have a high R2, the saturated model 
will not have as high of an adjusted R2.  Ideally, the model builder would want both R2 and adjusted R2 to 
be close to “1,” as well as close to each other.   
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residuals, this requires Shapiro-Wilk p-values over 0.05.  The Total Cost Growth model 
had a Shapiro-Wilk p-value of 0.4631; thus failing to reject the null hypothesis.  The final 
diagnostic applied to the Total Cost Growth model tests the residuals for constant 
variance using the Breusch-Pagan Test. With this test, a p-value below 0.05 rejects the 
null hypothesis that the residuals have constant variance.  Thus, similar to the Shapiro-
Wilk Test, because the optimal model will have constant variance of its residuals, this 
requires Breusch-Pagan p-values over 0.05.  The Breusch-Pagan p-value for the Total 
Cost Growth model was 0.1110.  
 Per Unit Cost Growth 
 The models for predicting Per Unit Cost Growth include the entire DoD dataset, 
as well as excluding strategic missiles in order to provide a model similar to the one 
provided for Total Cost Growth.  Using the methodology outline in Chapter III, the entire 
DoD dataset yielded two separate models for predicting Per Unit Cost Growth.  
Equations 8 and 9 provide these models: 
CGU1 = 0.869 – 0.941*(Ground Equip) – 0.661*(FFP)       (8) 
where CGU1 is the dependent variable and is the predicted Per Unit Cost Growth as a 
percentage of the system’s original estimate for unit cost, Ground Equip is a binary 
variable with a value of “1” for ground equipment systems and a value of “0” otherwise, 
and FFP is a binary variable with a value of “1” for systems developed using a Firm 
Fixed Price contract and a value of “0” otherwise.  The negative coefficients on both the 
Ground Equipment and Firm Fixed Price variables indicate that both of these factors are 
associated with lower Per Unit Cost Growth.  The R2 for this model is 0.50 and the 
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adjusted R2 is 0.44.  Appendix D provides the complete output provided by the JMP 
Software (JMP®, 2005) for this regression. 
The model’s diagnostics are satisfactory with all points having a Cook’s Distance 
below 0.15, the studentized residuals Shapiro-Wilk p-value of 0.7392, and the residuals 
Breusch-Pagan p-value of 0.0581.  Because the Breusch-Pagan p-value is very close to 
the rejection point of being below 0.05, the analysis examines the plot of the residuals 
versus the predicted values (Figure 31) to identify the extent to which the residuals have 
non-constant variance.  From Figure 31, it appears that a single point to the far left may 
be driving this low Breusch-Pagan p-value.  Removing this observation increases the 
Breusch-Pagan p-value to 0.0721.  Appendix E provides the complete output provided by 
the JMP Software (JMP®, 2005) for this regression with the single observation removed. 
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
%
 P
er
 U
ni
t C
os
t
G
ro
w
th
 R
es
id
ua
l
-1.0 -0.5 .0 .5 1.0 1.5 2.0
% Per Unit Cost
Growth Predicted
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31.  Residuals versus Predicted Plot for  
DoD Per Unit Cost Growth Model 1 
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 The second model for predicting Per Unit Cost Growth is: 
CGU2 = 2.069 – 1.178*(Ground Equip) – 0.664*(PM Tenure)       (9) 
where CGU2 is the dependent variable and is the predicted Per Unit Cost Growth as a 
percentage of the system’s original estimate for unit cost, Ground Equip is a binary 
variable with a value of “1” for ground equipment systems and a value of “0” otherwise, 
and PM Tenure is a continuous variable representing the average Program Manager 
Tenure.  The negative coefficients on both the Ground Equipment and PM Tenure 
variables indicate that both of these factors are associated with lower Per Unit Cost 
Growth.  The R2 for this model is 0.47 and the adjusted R2 is 0.41.  Appendix F provides 
the complete output provided by the JMP Software (JMP®, 2005) for this regression.  The 
diagnostics for this model are all satisfactory with all points having a Cook’s Distance 
below 0.15, the studentized residuals having a Shapiro-Wilk p-value of 0.3160, and the 
residuals having a Breusch-Pagan p-value of 0.7838. 
 The last model for Per Unit Cost Growth removes the 5 strategic missile 
observations from the DoD dataset, to provide a model comparable to the one for Total 
Cost Growth.  Equation 10 provides this model: 
CGU3 = 0.945 – 1.153*(Ground Equip) – 0.666*(FFP)     (10) 
where CGU3 is the dependent variable and is the predicted Per Unit Cost Growth as a 
percentage of the system’s original estimate for unit cost, Ground Equip is a binary 
variable with a value of “1” for ground equipment systems and a value of “0” otherwise, 
and FFP is a binary variable with a value of “1” for systems developed using a Firm 
Fixed Price contract and a value of “0” otherwise.  Note that this model includes the same 
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factors as Equation 8, which was for the entire DoD dataset.  As with Equation 8, 
Equation 10 also has negative coefficients for both Ground Equipment and Firm Fixed 
Price, indicating that both of these factors are associated with lower Per Unit Cost 
Growth.  The R2 for this model is 0.56 and the adjusted R2 is 0.49.  Appendix G provides 
the complete output provided by the JMP Software (JMP®, 2005) for this regression.  The 
diagnostics for this model are also satisfactory with all points having a Cook’s Distance 
below 0.2, the studentized residuals having a Shapiro-Wilk p-value of 0.8562, and the 
residuals having a Breusch-Pagan p-value of 0.0697. 
Inferential Analysis: NASA 
 Cost Growth 
 As discussed in Chapter III, due to the bimodal nature of the distribution, 
modeling NASA Cost Growth consists of a two stage process.  The first stage includes a 
logistic regression model to determine whether a program is likely to experience high 
cost growth.  The second stage includes separate linear regression models for both high 
and low cost growth to determine the likely percentage of cost growth.  Note that the low 
cost growth model also includes zero and negative cost growth.   
 Logistic Regression Models.  The analysis results in two logistic models for 
predicting the likelihood of a program to experience high cost growth; Equations 11 and 
13 provide these models: 15   
 LHCG1         =  e 2.140 – 0.058*(Initial Program Size) + 0.001*(Total Mass)       (11) 
 1 + e 2.140 – 0.058*(Initial Program Size) + 0.001*(Total Mass) 
                                                 
15 Note that JMP® uses the logistic response function:         e – (ß0 + ß1X1  ß2X2 + ß3X3)         (“JMP®”, 2005). 
          1 + e – (ß0 + ß1X1  ß2X2 + ß3X3) 
For ease of use and interpretation, the negative sign has been multiplied through the parameter estimates it 
the equations provided in the text.  Thus, the parameter estimates in the JMP® regression outputs in the 
Appendices have the opposite sign as those listed within this text. 
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where LHCG is the dependent variable and is a likelihood function that expresses the 
probability that a program will experience high cost growth, Initial Program Size is a 
continuous variable that measures the original estimated cost of the program in CY07 
dollars, and Total Mass is a continuous variable that measures the mass of the spacecraft 
(including consumable propellants) in kilograms.  For our purposes, a LHCG probability 
greater than or equal to 0.5 (50%) predicts a program will experience high cost growth, 
and a probability of less than 0.5 predicts the program will not experience high cost 
growth.  Based on the coefficients, larger Initial Program Sizes decreases the likelihood 
of experiencing high cost growth; whereas more massive spacecraft increases the 
likelihood of experiencing high cost growth.  To assess the utility of the model, the R2 
(U) is examined.  The R2 (U) is a ratio of likelihoods (Equation 12) measuring the 
proportion of the total uncertainty attributed to the fitted model.   
R2 (U)  =  -Loglikelihood for Difference between Reduced and Full Model     (12) 
-Loglikelihood for Reduced Model 
This ratio of likelihoods compares the uncertainty from fitting the model to the 
uncertainty from background effects to determine whether the independent variables have 
an effect on the response variable (“JMP®”, 2005).  R2 (U) ranges between 0 and 1, with 
higher values indicating a more predictive model.  R2 (U) values equal to or greater than 
0.4 are desirable (White, 2007).  The NASA High Cost Growth? model provided in 
Equation 11 has an R2 (U) of 0.57.  See Appendix H for the complete logistic regression 
output provided by the JMP Software (JMP®, 2005). 
 Although the diagnostics used for linear regression analysis are not available for 
logistic regression, the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve can be used to 
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assess the model’s accuracy.  The ROC curve distinguishes between false-positives and 
true-positives, or in other words, how often the model predicts a value of “1” when the 
actual value is “0” compared to predicting a value of “1” when the actual value is “1.”  A 
ROC curve that runs along the 45 degree diagonal of the graph would have an area under 
the curve of 0.50, and would have no predictive capability.  A ROC curve consisting of a 
vertical line from the point (0, 0) to (0, 1) and then a horizontal line from (0, 1) to (1, 1) 
would be perfectly predictive and have an area of 1.0.  The logistic model in Equation 11 
has a ROC curve area of 0.95, indicating an estimated accuracy of 95%.  See Figure 32 
for the ROC curve of LHCG1. 
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Figure 32.  LHCG1 Receiver Operating Curve  
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 Equation 13 provides the second model for predicting High Cost Growth?: 
 LHCG2 =       e 0.741 – 0.038*(Initial Program Size) + 0.001*(Dry Mass) + 38.705*(Microgravity)      (13) 
    1 + e 0.741 – 0.038*(Initial Program Size) + 0.001*(Dry Mass) + 38.705*(Microgravity)      
where LHCG is the dependent variable and is a likelihood function that expresses the 
probability that a program will experience high cost growth, Initial Program Size is a 
continuous variable that measures the original estimated cost of the program in CY07 
dollars, Dry Mass is a continuous variable that measures the mass of the spacecraft 
(excluding consumable propellants) in kilograms, and Microgravity is a binary variable 
with a value of “1” for those systems with a microgravity mission and a value of “0” 
otherwise.  Based on the coefficients, larger Initial Program Sizes decreases the 
likelihood of experiencing high cost growth, more massive spacecraft increases the 
likelihood of experiencing high cost growth, and a microgravity mission increases the 
likelihood of experiencing high cost growth.  The R2 (U) associated with this model is 
0.50, and the ROC curve area (Figure 33) is 0.94.  See Appendix I for the complete 
logistic regression output provided by the JMP Software (JMP®, 2005). 
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 Linear Regression Models.  The analysis developed separate linear regression 
models for high and low cost growth programs.  These models are designed to be used in 
conjunction with the logistic regression models provided in Equations 11 and 13.  If the 
logistic regression models predict that high cost growth is likely to occur, then the High 
Cost Growth Linear Regression Model (Equation 14) can be used to predict the likely 
percent cost growth.  Similarly, if the logistic regression models predict that high cost 
growth is not likely to occur, the Low Cost Growth Linear Regression Model (Equation 
15) can be used to predict the likely percent cost growth. 
 The High Cost Growth Linear Regression Model is: 
CGH = 1.232 + 1.037*(Space Physics)       (14) 
Figure 33.  LHCG2 Receiver Operating Curve  
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where CGH is the dependent variable and is the predicted Cost Growth as a percentage of 
the original cost estimate, and Space Physics is a binary variable with a value of “1” for 
systems with a space physics mission and a value of “0” otherwise.  The positive 
coefficient on Space Physics indicates that space physics missions are associated with 
higher Cost Growth.  The R2 for this model is 0.77 and the adjusted R2 is 0.74.  Appendix 
J provides the complete output provided by the JMP Software (JMP®, 2005) for this 
regression.  The diagnostics for this model are all satisfactory with all points having a 
Cook’s Distance below 0.4, the studentized residuals having a Shapiro-Wilk p-value of 
0.5716, and the residuals having a Breusch-Pagan p-value of 0.9189. 
The Low Cost Growth Linear Regression Model is: 
CGL = 0.509 – 0.014*(Program Start)       (15) 
where CGL is the dependent variable and is the predicted Cost Growth as a percentage of 
the original cost estimate, and Program Start is a continuous variable measured as the 
number of years from 1964.  The negative coefficient on Program Start signifies that 
more recent programs are associated with lower cost growth.  The R2 for this model is 
0.18 and the adjusted R2 is 0.16.  These low R2 values indicate that most of the variation 
for cost growth for systems that experience low cost growth is due to factors not 
explained by the model.  See Appendix K for the complete output provided by the JMP 
Software (JMP®, 2005) for this regression.  The diagnostics for this model are all 
satisfactory with all points having a Cook’s Distance below 0.15, the studentized 
residuals having a Shapiro-Wilk p-value of 0.2607, and the residuals having a Breusch-
Pagan p-value of 0.0841. 
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 Schedule Growth 
 As with NASA Cost Growth, modeling NASA Schedule Growth also consists of a 
two stage approach: first using logistic regression to predict the likelihood of 
experiencing high schedule growth, then using linear regression to predict the quantity of 
schedule growth. 
 Logistic Regression Model.  The logistic model for High Schedule Growth is 
given in Equation 16: 
LHSG         =  e -2.186 + 0.001*(Final Program Size)       (16) 
  1 + e -2.186 + 0.001*(Final Program Size) 
where LHSG is the dependent variable and is a likelihood function that expresses the 
probability that a program will experience high schedule growth, and Final Program Size 
is a continuous variable that measures the final cost of the program in CY07 dollars.  The 
R2 (U) associated with this model is 0.15, and the ROC curve area (Figure 34) is 0.76.  
The relatively low R2 (U) and ROC curve areas indicate that this model is not as 
predictive as the cost growth logistic models.  See Appendix L for the complete output 
provided by the JMP Software (JMP®, 2005) for this regression 
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Linear Regression Models.  The analysis developed separate linear regression 
models for high and low schedule growth programs.  As with the cost growth models, 
these models are designed to be used in conjunction with the logistic regression model 
provided in Equations 16.  If the High Schedule Growth? model predicts that high 
schedule growth is likely to occur, then the High Schedule Growth Linear Regression 
Model (Equation 17) can be used to predict the likely percent of schedule growth.  If the 
High Schedule Growth? model predicts that high schedule growth is not likely to occur, 
then the Low Schedule Growth Linear Regression Model (Equation 18) can be used to 
predict the likely percent of schedule growth. 
The High Schedule Growth Linear Regression Model is: 
Figure 34.  LHSG Receiver Operating Curve  
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SGH = 0.899 + 1.188 *(JPL) + 0.587 *(Int’l Develop)     (17) 
where SGH is the dependent variable and is the predicted Schedule Growth as a 
percentage of the original schedule in months from program initiation, JPL is a binary 
variable with a value of “1” for systems developed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and 
a value of “0” otherwise, and Int’l Develop is a binary variable with a value of “1” for 
systems developed by organizations belonging to countries other than the United States 
and a value of “0” otherwise.  The positive coefficients on both JPL and Int’l Develop 
indicate that both of these variables are associated with higher Schedule Growth.  The R2 
for this model is 0.79 and the adjusted R2 is 0.73.  Appendix M provides the complete 
output provided by the JMP Software (JMP®, 2005) for this regression.  The diagnostics 
for this model are: two points have a Cook’s Distance over 0.5, the studentized residuals 
have a Shapiro-Wilk p-value of 0.8971, and the residuals have a Breusch-Pagan p-value 
of 0.0666.  Removal of the two influential data points that have a Cook’s Distance over 
0.5 results in the removal of the two points that represent the Int’l Develop variable (total 
sample size is 9 observations).  Removal of these two points does not affect the intercept, 
nor the coefficient or significance level for the JPL variable.  The diagnostics for the 
model without the two influential data points are: all points have a Cook’s Distance 
below 0.3, the studentized residuals have a Shapiro-Wilk p-value of 0.3357, and the 
residuals have a Breusch-Pagan p-value of 0.4450.  Appendix N provides the complete 
output provided by the JMP Software (JMP®, 2005) for this regression with the two 
influential data points removed. 
The Low Schedule Growth Linear Regression Model is: 
SGL = 0.252 + 0.243 *(Northrop Grumman) – 0.274 *(Johns Hopkins)    (18) 
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where SGL is the dependent variable and is the predicted Schedule Growth as a 
percentage of the original schedule in months from program initiation, Northrop 
Grumman is a binary variable with a value of “1” for systems developed by Northrop 
Grumman (or its predecessors) and a value of “0” otherwise, and Johns Hopkins is a 
binary variable with a value of “1” for systems developed by Johns Hopkins University 
and a value of “0” otherwise.  The positive coefficient on Northrop Grumman indicates 
that this developer is associated with higher Schedule Growth; whereas the negative 
coefficient on Johns Hopkins indicates that this developer is associated with lower 
Schedule Growth. The R2 for this model is 0.27 and the adjusted R2 is 0.23.  These low 
R2 values indicate that most of the variation for schedule growth for systems that 
experience low schedule growth is due to factors not explained by the model. Appendix 
O provides the complete output provided by the JMP Software (JMP®, 2005) for this 
regression.  The diagnostics for this model are: one point has a Cook’s Distance over 0.5, 
the studentized residuals have a Shapiro-Wilk p-value of 0.8105, and the residuals have a 
Breusch-Pagan p-value of 0.2848.  Removal of the influential data point does not impact 
the intercept nor the coefficient or significance level for the Johns Hopkins variable.  The 
removal of the influential data point increases the coefficient for Northrop Grumman 
from 0.243 to 0.411 and improves the significance level for this variable.  The 
diagnostics for the model without the influential data point are: all points have a Cook’s 
Distance below 0.1, the studentized residuals have a Shapiro-Wilk p-value of 0.0782, and 
the residuals have a Breusch-Pagan p-value of 0.2678.  Appendix P provides the 
complete output provided by the JMP Software (JMP®, 2005) for this regression with the 
influential data point removed. 
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Chapter Summary 
 This chapter presented the Preliminary and Inferential Analysis for cost growth of 
DoD systems and for cost and schedule growth of NASA systems.  The Preliminary 
Analysis explored potential relationships between individual predictors and the responses 
through graphical presentation.  The Preliminary Analysis also identified correlations 
between predictor variables.  The Inferential Analysis presented linear and logistic 
regression models for predicting cost and schedule growth, along with the diagnostics 
used to assess these models.  The next chapter provides further discussion on these 
models and the predictors they identified as significant. 
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V. Discussion 
Chapter Overview 
 This chapter highlights those factors found to be predictive of cost and schedule 
growth.  The discussion begins with the predictors of Department of Defense (DoD) 
space system cost growth and then turns to predictors of National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) space systems cost and schedule growth.  The chapter concludes 
with a discussion of the limitations of the study and recommendations for future research.   
DoD Predictor Discussion 
 The models for DoD cost growth provided in Table 5 reveal that communications 
missions, ground equipment, firm-fixed price contracts, and increased program manager 
tenure are all predictive of lower cost growth.  One possible explanation for reduced cost 
growth for communications missions and ground equipment is the prevalence of these 
technologies in the commercial sector.  The widespread use and availability of these 
types of technologies in both public and private sectors may make these technologies 
more mature, and thus less risky, than other missions and commodity types.  Ground 
equipment also benefits from the ability to test in an operational environment, a luxury 
that most space-based systems do not have. 
 
Table 5.  DoD Cost Growth Regression Equations 
Model Title Model Fit Exclusions 
Total Cost 
Growth CGT = 0.715 – 0.577*(Communications) 
R2 0.29  
Adj. R2 0.24 
Strategic 
Missiles and 
Titan IV 
Per Unit Cost 
Growth Model 1 
CGU = 0.869 – 0.941*(Ground Equip) – 
0.661*(FFP) 
R2 0.50  
Adj. R2 0.44 None 
Per Unit Cost 
Growth Model 2 
CGU = 2.069 – 1.178*(Ground Equip) – 
0.664*(PM Tenure) 
R2 0.47  
Adj. R2 0.41 None 
Per Unit Cost 
Growth Model 3 
CGU = 0.945 – 1.153*(Ground Equip) – 
0.666*(FFP) 
R2 0.56 
Adj. R2 0.49 
Strategic 
Missiles 
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The study also found firm-fixed price contracts (contracts with a specified 
payment amount) to be predictive of lower cost growth.  This finding is consistent with 
Rossetti’s (2004) finding that firm-fixed price contracts are predictive of reduced support 
cost growth for DoD weapon systems.  However, it is important to remember that 
regression analysis identifies relationships but does not indicate cause and effect.  It could 
be that firm-fixed price contracts provide contractors with an incentive to minimize cost 
growth, since additional costs reduce their profit margin.  An alternative explanation is 
that government programs use firm-fixed price contracts on programs that are relatively 
well defined, have mature technologies, and are less risky.  Thus, while the models 
indicate that firm-fixed price contracts are associated with reduced cost growth, the 
models do not reveal whether these types of contracts lead to lower cost growth or are 
deliberately chosen for the types of programs that would be expected to have lower cost 
growth. 
Both the Young Task Force (Defense Science, 2003) and the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) (Government, 2006) studies identify high turnover of 
Program Managers is a factor that contributes to the cost growth of space systems.  This 
study supports this assessment, finding that longer Program Manager tenures are 
predictive of lower cost growth (and thus, shorter tenures are predictive of higher cost 
growth).  Additionally, this study quantifies the impact of Program Manager tenure, 
finding that a one year increase in Program Manager tenure is associated with a reduction 
in per unit cost growth of 66.4 percentage points. 
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Although a number of DoD weapons systems cost growth studies have found 
smaller programs to be associated with higher cost growth, this study did not find 
program size to be predictive of cost growth for space systems. 
NASA Predictor Discussion 
Cost Growth 
Due to the bimodal nature of the cost growth data for the NASA dataset, the 
inferential analysis began with dividing the dataset into high cost growth and low cost 
growth programs, and then used logistic regression to assess whether a program was 
likely to experience high or low cost growth (low cost growth includes no cost growth as 
well as negative cost growth).  Table 6 provides the NASA cost growth models. 
 
Table 6.  NASA Cost Growth Regression Equations 
Model 
Title 
Model Fit 
High Cost 
Growth? 
Logistic 
Model 1 
LHCG = e 2.140 – 0.058*(Initial Program Size) + 0.001*(Total Mass)    
 1 + e 2.140 – 0.058*(Initial Program Size) + 0.001*(Total Mass) R2 (U) 0.57 
High Cost 
Growth? 
Logistic 
Model 2 
LHCG = e 0.741 – 0.038*(Initial Program Size) + 0.001*(Dry Mass) + 38.705*(Microgravity)   
        1 + e 0.741 – 0.038*(Initial Program Size) + 0.001*(Dry Mass) + 38.705*(Microgravity) R
2 (U) 0.50 
High Cost 
Growth 
Linear 
Model 
CGH = 1.232 + 1.037*(Space Physics)  
R2 0.77  
Adj. R2 0.74 
Low Cost 
Growth 
Linear 
Model 
CGL = 0.509 – 0.014*(Program Start) 
R2 0.18  
Adj. R2 0.16 
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From the logistic regression analysis, this study found that larger program size 
(measured in total cost) decreased the likelihood of being a high cost growth program, 
whereas more massive spacecrafts and microgravity missions increased the likelihood of 
being a high cost growth program.  This finding of larger programs being associated with 
lower cost growth is consistent with many other cost growth studies (Schaffer, 2004; 
McCrillis, 2003; Dameron et al., 2002; Pannell, 1994:42; Drezner et al., 1993:27).  As 
discussed in Chapter II, smaller programs are more likely to experience high cost growth 
due to minimal oversight and because equivalent costs and increases in costs represent 
proportionally greater amounts of the total cost for smaller programs (Drezner et al., 
1993:49).  Further study is recommend to determine the cause of the increased likelihood 
of high cost growth for more massive spacecraft and microgravity missions.  While this 
increased likelihood could be an indication of the increased technical complexity of these 
types of systems, it may also be an indication of other problems unique to these programs 
such as inadequate cost estimating procedures, deficient program acquisition processes, 
or other technical or scientific issues. 
After using the logistic regression to determine the likelihood of high cost growth, 
the linear regression models are then used for determining the quantity of cost growth.  
For those programs that are likely to experience high cost growth, the amount of cost 
growth increases for those programs from a space physics mission.  Again, further study 
is recommended to identify the root causes for this relationship. 
For programs in which the logistic models predict to be likely to experience low 
cost growth, program start date is the best predictor of the amount of cost growth, with 
more recent programs associated with lower cost growth.  Further study is recommended 
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to determine if this relationship is an indication of improved program acquisition or cost 
estimating processes. 
Schedule Growth 
 Similar to the cost growth analysis for NASA space systems, the schedule growth 
dataset also displays a bimodal distribution.  Thus, the inferential analysis began with 
dividing the dataset into high schedule growth and low schedule growth programs, and 
then used logistic regression to assess whether a program was likely to have high or low 
schedule growth.  After determining whether or not high schedule growth was likely, the 
linear regression models are then used to determine the amount of likely growth.  Table 7 
provides the NASA schedule growth models. 
 
Table 7.  NASA Schedule Growth Regression Equations 
Model Title Model Fit 
High 
Schedule 
Growth? 
Logistic 
Model 
LHSG  =      e -2.186 + 0.001*(Final Program Size)   
             1 + e -2.186 + 0.001*(Final Program Size) R2 (U) 0.15 
High 
Schedule 
Growth 
Linear Model 
SGH = 0.899 + 1.188 *(JPL) + 0.587 *(Int’l Develop) 
R2 0.79  
Adj. R2 0.73 
Low 
Schedule 
Growth 
Linear Model 
SGL = 0.252 + 0.243 *(Northrop Grumman) – 0.274 *(Johns 
Hopkins)  
R2 0.27  
Adj. R2 0.23 
 
 
 The logistic regression results found that larger programs (measured in total cost) 
are more likely to experience high schedule growth.  For those programs likely to 
experience high schedule growth, the linear regressions reveal that those programs 
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developed by JPL or an International developer (outside of the U.S.) experience a greater 
amount of schedule growth.  For those programs likely to experience low schedule 
growth, those developed by Northrop Grumman are associated with increased schedule 
growth, whereas those space systems developed by Johns Hopkins are associated with a 
reduced amount of schedule growth.  Keep in mind that these results do not indicate 
cause and effect; more research is needed to discover whether these developers have 
processes that actually lead to schedule growth (or reduced growth in the case of Johns 
Hopkins) or if they are more likely to take-on complex projects that possess other factors 
leading to schedule growth. 
Interestingly, the study did not find a predictive relationship between cost and 
schedule growth for NASA space systems; many of the programs that experienced cost 
growth did not experience schedule growth and vice versa.  Note that the study did not 
find these variables to be negatively correlated either; that is, it does not appear that the 
programs avoid one type of growth by permitting the other (e.g., increasing costs in order 
to reduce schedule slip).  The finding that these types of growth are not strongly 
correlated, and thus have different factors influencing each, is consistent with the findings 
of Foreman (2007) and Drezner and Smith (1990).  
Conclusions 
 This study provides defense and civil cost estimators and space system acquirers 
with a set of models to aid in predicting cost and schedule growth.  Since many of the 
systems that the defense space acquisition community will be tasked to acquire will be 
systems other than ground equipment and communications systems, the analysis suggests 
that cost estimators and acquirers should anticipate that other systems are likely to 
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experience higher cost growth, and should plan accordingly.  Additionally, this research 
indicates that longer Program Manager tenures are associated with decreased cost growth.  
The respective model predicts that increasing the average Program Manager tenure by 
one-year will reduce the anticipated per unit cost growth by 66.4 percentage points.  
Thus, this research supports the recommendation of Young’s Task Force to increase the 
length of Program Managers’ tenures (Defense Science, 2003). 
 Similarly, while NASA will continue to procure a variety of systems, with wide 
ranges of program sizes, spacecraft sizes, and mission types, it would behoove cost 
estimators and acquirers to recognize that smaller programs, more massive spacecraft, 
and microgravity and space physics missions are more vulnerable to experiencing higher 
cost growth.  Additionally, cost estimators and acquirers should also recognize that while 
larger programs are less vulnerable to cost growth, they are more vulnerable to schedule 
growth. 
Study Limitations 
 This study is an exploratory analysis, intended to provide a starting point for 
developing space system cost and schedule growth models for use by space system 
acquirers and cost estimators.  The study seeks not only to identify the best predictors of 
cost and schedule growth, but also to identify an appropriate methodology for acquirers 
and cost estimators to use in establishing their own models.  While linear regression 
analysis is sufficient for DoD space programs, it is not suitable on its own for NASA 
space systems.  Instead, the analysis found that NASA systems have bimodal 
distributions that are best modeled by first using logistic regression to determine if a 
program was likely to experience high or low growth, and then using linear regression 
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models to predict the likely amount of growth.  While most of the models are highly 
predictive, users of the models should keep these limitations in mind: 
• This study is a starting point for quantitatively assessing space system cost growth 
using regression analysis.  The models should be further validated with space 
systems outside of the original dataset.  Until this has been accomplished, the 
models are only known to be predictive of programs within the dataset. 
• The study identified a bimodal relationship for cost and schedule growth among 
NASA programs, however the number of programs belonging to the high cost 
growth and high schedule growth categories is relatively small.  The NASA 
dataset should be augmented with additional programs to verify this bimodal 
relationship. 
• This study identifies and quantifies those factors that are best predictors of space 
system cost and schedule growth; however, it does not include the depth of a 
qualitative study in investigating the root causes of these relationships. 
• This study included only DoD Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) 
reported in the Selected Acquisition Report and select NASA spacecraft.  The 
study does not account for commercial space systems, classified space systems, 
NRO space systems, or non-MDAP programs. 
• There are many potential predictors of cost and schedule growth that were not 
included in the analysis due to the lack of available data.  Potential predictors not 
evaluated include: schedule milestones, number of requirements and requirements 
changes, amount of systems engineering expertise, and level of technology 
maturity. 
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• The models can only be as sound as the data from which they are derived.  
Inconsistencies in data format such as which costs are included in the total figure, 
the level of technology maturity when the program was initiated, and the 
combination or division of multiple satellites into a single or several programs, all 
affect the accuracy of the models. 
• The study also includes some assumptions for the inflation and quantity 
adjustments.  For example, when adjusting DoD Total Cost Growth for quantity, 
the current estimate was adjusted by omitting the Quantity Variance category 
from the SAR.  This assumes that all cost growth related to quantity is captured in 
this category.  With the NASA datasets, the final cost was adjusted for inflation 
by assuming that all costs were in then year dollars for the launch year rather than 
breaking the costs down by each year they were incurred and adjusting each year 
for inflation separately.  It was assumed that the bulk of funds are spent at the tail 
end of the program and that assuming all costs were incurred during the launch 
year would be a close approximation.  While the inflation and quantity 
adjustments are not perfect, they better capture reality than if no adjustments were 
made at all. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 From this study stems numerous avenues for further research.  Potential future 
areas for study include: 
• Test models provided herein with additional data from other NASA and DoD 
programs to validate models or establish more robust models, 
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• Test models provided herein using data from commercial and classified systems 
to see if the models apply or if new models are needed, 
• Explore additional predictor variables not evaluated herein, such as requirements, 
systems engineering expertise, or technological maturity, 
• Augment NASA data with additional space programs to see if the bimodal 
distributions for cost and schedule growth hold, or 
• Further explore relationships identified herein using a more in-depth qualitative 
analysis. 
Chapter Summary 
 This study provides a foundation for predicting space system cost and schedule 
growth.  It explored numerous programmatic characteristics to identify those that are best 
predictors of growth.  The study provides four models for use in predicting DoD space 
system cost growth.  It also identified a bimodal distribution for cost and schedule growth 
of NASA space systems, and thus established a series of logistic and linear models to 
assist in cost and schedule growth forecasting for NASA space systems. 
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Appendix A. List of DoD Space Systems 
System Name 
Initial 
Selected 
Acquisition 
Report 
(SAR) 
Description 
Advanced Extremely High Frequency 
(AEHF) 
2002 Satellite 
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle 
(EELV) 
1999 Launch Vehicle 
Global Broadcast Service (GBS) 1997 Ground Equipment 
Minuteman III Guidance Replacement 
Program (GRP) 
1993 Strategic Missile Upgrade 
Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement 
Program (PRP) 
1996 Strategic Missile Upgrade 
NAVSTAR Global Positioning System 
(GPS) 
1980 Satellite 
NAVSTAR Global Positioning System 
(GPS) Equipment 
1980 Ground Equipment 
National Polar-orbiting Operational 
Environmental Satellite System 
(NPOESS) 
2002 Satellite 
Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) 
High 
1997 Satellite 
Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) 2001 Satellite 
Mobile User Objective System 
(MUOS) 
2004 Satellite 
Defense Satellite Communication 
System (DSCS) III 
1977 Satellite 
Defense Support Program (DSP) 1983 Satellite 
Inertial Upper Stage (IUS) 1982 Launch Vehicle Upper Stage 
Peacekeeper 1983 Strategic Missile 
Titan IV 1985 Launch Vehicle 
Minuteman II 1969 Strategic Missile 
Minuteman III 1969 Strategic Missile 
Defense Meteorological Satellite 
Program (DMSP) 
1983 Satellite 
MILSTAR 1992 Satellite 
Single Channel Anti-jam Man-Portable 
Terminal (SCAMP) 
1992 Ground Equipment 
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Appendix B. List of NASA Space Systems 
Program Name Initial budget year 
Launch 
Date Full Name 
ACE 1994 Aug-97 Advanced Composition Explorer Satellite 
ACTS 1983 Sep-93 Advanced Communications Technology Satellite 
AE-C 1971 Dec-73 Atmosphere Explorer-C 
AEM-HCMM 1974 Apr-78 Application Explorer Mission-Heat Capacity Mapping Mission 
ATS-1 Not Available Dec-66 Applications Technology Satellite 1
ATS-2 Not Available Apr-67 Applications Technology Satellite 2
ATS-5 Not Available Aug-69 Applications Technology Satellite 5
ATS-6 1968 May-74 Applications Technology Satellite 6
Aura 1993 Jul-04 Aura 
AXAF 1990 Jul-99 (Chandra) Advanced X-Ray Astrophysics Facility  
CALIPSO 1999 Apr-06 Cloud-Aerosol Lidar and Infrared Pathfinder Satellite Observations 
Cassini 1990 Oct-97 Cassini 
CloudSat 1999 Apr-06 CloudSat 
COBE 1982 Nov-89 Cosmic Background Explorer 
CONTOUR 2000 Jul-02 Comet Nucleus Tour 
COSTR 1987 Jul-92 Collaborative Solar Terrestrial Research 
Deep Space 1 1996 Oct-98 Deep Space 1 
DSCS-2 1969 Nov-71 Defense Satellite Communications System 
Endeavour 1987 May-92 Shuttle Orbiter Endeavour (OV-105) 
EO-1 1996 Nov-00 Earth Observing One 
ESSP (VCL/GRACE) 1997 Mar-02 
Earth Systems Science Pathfinder 
(Vegetation Canopy Lidar/Gravity 
Recovery and Climate Experiment) 
EUVE 1984 Jun-92 Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer 
FAST 1989 Aug-96 Fast Auroral Snapshot Explorer 
FUSE 1995 Jun-99 Far Ultraviolet Spectroscopic Explorer 
GALEX 1998 Apr-03 Galaxy Evolution Explorer 
Galileo 1978 Oct-89 Galileo 
Genesis 1998 Aug-01 Genesis 
GOES I-M 1984 Apr-94 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite 
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GRO 1981 Apr-91 (Compton) Gamma Ray Observatory 
HEAO-A 1972 Aug-77 High Energy Astronomical Observatory 
HESSI 1998 Feb-02 High Energy Solar Spectroscopic Imager (now RHESSI) 
HETE-II 1997 Oct-00 High Energy Transient Experiment/Explorer 
HST 1977 Apr-90 Hubble Space Telescope 
ICESat 1996 Jan-03 Ice, Clouds and Land Elevation Satellite 
IMAGE 1996 Mar-00 Imager for Magnetopause to Aurora Global Exploration 
LANDSAT-A 1969 Jul-72 Land Remote Sensing Satellite 
LANDSAT-D 1977 Jul-82 Land Remote Sensing Satellite 
Lunar Orbiter 1964 Aug-66 Lunar Orbiter 
Lunar Prospector 1996 Jan-98 Lunar Prospector Orbiter 
Magellan 1984 May-89 Magellan 
MAP 1996 Jun-01 (Wilkinson) Microwave Anisotropy Probe 
Mars Observer 1985 Sep-92 Mars Observer 
Mars Odyssey 1998 Apr-01 Mars Odyssey 
Mars Pathfinder 1994 Dec-96 Mars Pathfinder 
MCO 1996 Dec-98 Mars Climate Orbiter 
MER 2000 Jun-03 Mars Exploration Rover 
MGS 1994 Nov-96 Mars Global Surveyor 
NEAR 1994 Feb-96 Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous (Shoemaker) 
NSCAT 1985 Aug-96 NASA Scatterometer 
OSO-8 1970 Jun-75 Orbiting Solar Observatory 
SCATHA 1976 Jan-79 Spacecraft Charging at High Altitudes 
SIRTF 1996 Aug-03 (Spitzer) Space Infrared Telescope Facility 
Skylab Workshop 1969 May-73 Skylab Workshop 
SMS-1 1970 May-74 Synchronized Meteorology Satellite
SORCE 1999 Jan-03 Solar Radiation and Climate Experiment 
Space Station 1987 Nov-98 International Space Station Alpha (ISSA) 
Spacelab 1974 Nov-83 Spacelab 
STARDUST 1996 Feb-99 Star Dust 
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SWAS/TRACE/WIRE 1989 Apr-98 
Submillimeter Wave Astronomy 
Satellite/Transition Region and 
Coronal Explorer/Wide-Field 
Infrared Explorer 
TDRSS replen 1994 Jun-00 Tracking and Data Relay Satellite - 3 replenishment satellites 
TDRSS-7 1986 Jul-95 Tracking and Data Relay Satellite 
Terra 1991 Dec-99 EOS AM-1 
TIMED 1997 Dec-01 
Thermosphere, Ionosphere, 
Mesosphere Energetics and 
Dynamics 
TIROS-M Not Available Jan-70 Television Infrared Observation Satellite (also ITOS-1) 
TOPEX 1987 Aug-92 Ocean Topography Experiment/Poseidon 
TRMM 1991 Nov-97 Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission 
TSS 1984 Jul-92 Tethered Satellite System 
UARS 1982 Sep-91 Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite 
Ulysses 1979 Oct-90 Ulysses 
Viking Lander 1970 Aug-75 Viking Lander 
XTE 1990 Dec-95 (Rossi) X-Ray Timing Explorer 
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Appendix C. DoD Total Cost Growth Linear Regression Model Output 
 
Whole Model     Msn: Communications 
Regression Plot    Leverage Plot 
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Actual by Predicted Plot   Residual by Predicted Plot 
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Summary of Fit 
  
RSquare 0.290373
RSquare Adj 0.235787
Root Mean Square Error 0.483612
Mean of Response 0.445538
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 15
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 1 1.2441269 1.24413 5.3195
Error 13 3.0404483 0.23388 Prob > F
C. Total 14 4.2845752 0.0382
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| Std Beta Min Value Max Value
Intercept 0.7149335 0.170983 4.18 0.0011 0  
Msn: Communications -0.577277 0.250293 -2.31 0.0382 -0.53886 0 1
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Appendix D. DoD Per Unit Cost Growth Linear Regression Model 1 Output 
 
Ground Equip       FFP 
Leverage Plot       Leverage Plot 
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Whole Model      
Actual by Predicted Plot    Residual by Predicted Plot 
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Summary of Fit 
  
RSquare 0.496146
RSquare Adj 0.440163
Root Mean Square Error 0.508769
Mean of Response 0.424743
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 21
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 2 4.5879632 2.29398 8.8623
Error 18 4.6592316 0.25885 Prob > F
C. Total 20 9.2471948 0.0021
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| Std Beta Min Value Max Value
Intercept 0.8693884 0.155493 5.59 <.0001 0  
Ground Equip -0.941423 0.263987 -3.57 0.0022 -0.60425 0 1
FFP -0.661491 0.238515 -2.77 0.0125 -0.46992 0 1
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Appendix E. DoD Per Unit Cost Growth Linear Regression Model 1 Output: 
Excludes GPS User Equipment 
 
Whole Model 
Actual by Predicted Plot   Residual by Predicted Plot 
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Ground Equip     FFP 
Leverage Plot      Leverage Plot 
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Summary of Fit 
  
RSquare 0.382844
RSquare Adj 0.310237
Root Mean Square Error 0.522114
Mean of Response 0.489074
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 20
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 2 2.8747826 1.43739 5.2728
Error 17 4.6342448 0.27260 Prob > F
C. Total 19 7.5090275 0.0165
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| Std Beta Min Value Max Value
Intercept 0.856553 0.165107 5.19 <.0001 0  
Ground Equip -0.896499 0.308887 -2.90 0.0099 -0.58524 0 1
FFP -0.627263 0.269618 -2.33 0.0326 -0.46912 0 1
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Appendix F. DoD Per Unit Cost Growth Linear Regression Model 2 Output 
Whole Model  
Actual by Predicted Plot    Residual by Predicted Plot 
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Ground Equip      PM Tenure 
Leverage Plot      Leverage Plot 
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Summary of Fit 
  
RSquare 0.467177
RSquare Adj 0.407974
Root Mean Square Error 0.523191
Mean of Response 0.424743
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 21
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 2 4.3200722 2.16004 7.8911
Error 18 4.9271226 0.27373 Prob > F
C. Total 20 9.2471948 0.0035
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| Std Beta Min Value Max Value
Intercept 2.0692045 0.591726 3.50 0.0026 0  
Ground Equip -1.177888 0.302594 -3.89 0.0011 -0.75602 0 1
PM Tenure -0.664477 0.264845 -2.51 0.0219 -0.48728 1 3
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Appendix G. DoD Per Unit Cost Growth Linear Regression Model 3 Output: 
Excludes Strategic Missiles 
 
Whole Model 
Actual by Predicted Plot    Residual by Predicted Plot 
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Ground Equip        FFP 
Leverage Plot       Leverage Plot 
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Summary of Fit 
  
RSquare 0.561866
RSquare Adj 0.49446
Root Mean Square Error 0.531616
Mean of Response 0.479506
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 16
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 2 4.7115613 2.35578 8.3356
Error 13 3.6740053 0.28262 Prob > F
C. Total 15 8.3855666 0.0047
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| Std Beta Min Value Max Value 
Intercept 0.9453955 0.181404 5.21 0.0002 0   
Ground Equip -1.153119 0.340798 -3.38 0.0049 -0.6217 0 1 
FFP -0.665813 0.27476 -2.42 0.0307 -0.44525 0 1 
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Appendix H. NASA Cost Growth Logistic Regression Model 1 Output 
 
Whole Model Test 
Model -LogLikelihood DF ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
Difference 10.683222 2 21.36644 <.0001
Full 8.153711 
Reduced 18.836933 
RSquare (U) 0.5671
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 54
 
Converged by Gradient 
 
Lack Of Fit 
Source DF -LogLikelihood ChiSquare
Lack Of Fit 51 8.1537110 16.30742
Saturated 53 0.0000000 Prob>ChiSq
Fitted 2 8.1537110 1.0000
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq Min Value Max Value
Intercept -2.139853 1.5549805 1.89 0.1688  
Initial Program Size (Original 
Estimate CY07) 
0.05798487 0.0265758 4.76 0.0291 9.9 27802
Total Mass (kg) -0.001285 0.0006474 3.94 0.0472 124 109000
For log odds of 0/1 
 
Effect Wald Tests 
Source Nparm DF Wald ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
Initial Program Size (Original Estimate CY07) 1 1 4.7605558 0.0291
Total Mass (kg) 1 1 3.93933688 0.0472
 
Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Source Nparm DF L-R ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
Initial Program Size (Original Estimate CY07) 1 1 21.3478893 <.0001
Total Mass (kg) 1 1 14.0306169 0.0002
 
Receiver Operating Characteristic 
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Using High Cost Growth?='1' to be the positive level 
Area Under Curve = 0.95139 
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Appendix I. NASA Cost Growth Logistic Regression Model 2 Output 
 
Whole Model Test 
Model -LogLikelihood DF ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
Difference 13.238856 3 26.47771 <.0001
Full 13.049413 
Reduced 26.288270 
RSquare (U) 0.5036
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 66
 
Converged by Gradient 
 
Lack Of Fit 
Source DF -LogLikelihood ChiSquare
Lack Of Fit 62 13.049413 26.09883
Saturated 65 0.000000 Prob>ChiSq
Fitted 3 13.049413 1.0000
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq Min Value Max Value
Intercept -0.7413099 1.0158722 0.53 0.4656  
Initial Program Size (Original 
Estimate CY07) 
0.03752431 0.0166158 5.10 0.0239 9.9 27802
Dry Mass (kg) -0.0008909 0.0003625 6.04 0.0140 117 90607
Msn: Microgravity -38.705311 83316.394 0.00 0.9996 0 1
For log odds of 0/1 
 
Effect Wald Tests 
Source Nparm DF Wald ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
Initial Program Size (Original Estimate CY07) 1 1 5.10013649 0.0239
Dry Mass (kg) 1 1 6.03971535 0.0140
Msn: Microgravity 1 1 2.15814e-7 0.9996
 
Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Source Nparm DF L-R ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
Initial Program Size (Original Estimate CY07) 1 1 23.2927602 <.0001
Dry Mass (kg) 1 1 17.3608073 <.0001
Msn: Microgravity 1 1 9.25815588 0.0023
 
Receiver Operating Characteristic 
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Using High Cost Growth?='1' to be the positive level 
Area Under Curve = 0.93957 
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Appendix J. NASA High Cost Growth Linear Regression Model Output 
 
Whole Model 
Regression Plot     Actual by Predicted Plot 
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Residual by Predicted Plot    Msn: Space Physics 
      Leverage Plot 
 
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
%
 C
os
t G
ro
w
th
Le
ve
ra
ge
 R
es
id
ua
ls
-0.1 .0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1.0 1.1
Msn: Space Physics
Leverage, P=0.0019
 
 
Summary of Fit 
  
RSquare 0.769929
RSquare Adj 0.737061
Root Mean Square Error 0.319372
Mean of Response 1.69328
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 9
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 1 2.3893554 2.38936 23.4253
Error 7 0.7139911 0.10200 Prob > F
C. Total 8 3.1033465 0.0019
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| Std Beta Min Value Max Value
Intercept 1.2324251 0.142828 8.63 <.0001 0  
Msn: Space Physics 1.0369233 0.214242 4.84 0.0019 0.877456 0 1
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Appendix K. NASA Low Cost Growth Linear Regression Model Output 
 
Whole Model 
Regression Plot     Actual by Predicted Plot 
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Residual by Predicted Plot    Program Start (Yrs from Baseline) 
Leverage Plot 
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Summary of Fit 
  
RSquare 0.179217
RSquare Adj 0.16456
Root Mean Square Error 0.290302
Mean of Response 0.187642
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 58
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 1 1.0304816 1.03048 12.2276
Error 56 4.7194180 0.08428 Prob > F
C. Total 57 5.7498996 0.0009
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| Std Beta Min Value Max Value
Intercept 0.50853 0.099368 5.12 <.0001 0  
Program Start (Yrs from Baseline) -0.013585 0.003885 -3.50 0.0009 -0.42334 0 36
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Appendix L. NASA Schedule Growth Logistic Regression Model Output 
 
Logistic Plot  Receiver Operating Characteristic 
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Using High Schedule Growth?='1' to be the positive level 
Area Under Curve = 0.76010 
 
Whole Model Test 
Model -LogLikelihood DF ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
Difference 3.747015 1 7.49403 0.0062
Full 21.826393 
Reduced 25.573407 
 
 
  
RSquare (U) 0.1465
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 47
 
 
Converged by Gradient 
 
Lack Of Fit 
Source DF -LogLikelihood ChiSquare
Lack Of Fit 44 21.826393 43.65279
Saturated 45 0.000000 Prob>ChiSq
Fitted 1 21.826393 0.4864
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiS
q
Min Value Max Value
Intercept 2.18565739 0.5739752 14.50 0.0001  
Final Program Size (Actual Cost CY07) -0.0013652 0.0005352 6.51 0.0107 23 38589
 
For log odds of 0/1 
 
Effect Wald Tests 
Source Nparm DF Wald ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Final Program Size (Actual Cost CY07) 1 1 6.50744631 0.0107 
 
Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Source Nparm DF L-R ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Final Program Size (Actual Cost CY07) 1 1 7.4940299 0.0062 
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Appendix M. NASA High Schedule Growth Linear Regression Model Output 
 
Whole Model 
Actual by Predicted Plot Residual by Predicted Plot 
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JPL  Int'l Develop 
Leverage Plot  Leverage Plot 
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Summary of Fit 
  
RSquare 0.799249
RSquare Adj 0.732332
Root Mean Square Error 0.24891
Mean of Response 1.161566
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 9
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 2 1.4799994 0.740000 11.9439
Error 6 0.3717381 0.061956 Prob > F
C. Total 8 1.8517375 0.0081
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| Std Beta Min Value Max Value
Intercept 0.899177 0.101617 8.85 0.0001 0  
JPL 1.1877795 0.268854 4.42 0.0045 0.822943 0 1
Int'l Develop 0.5868608 0.203234 2.89 0.0278 0.537883 0 1
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Appendix N. NASA High Schedule Growth Linear Regression Model Output: Two 
Influential Data Points Removed 
Whole Model 
Regression Plot      Actual by Predicted Plot 
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Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 1 1.2092745 1.20927 49.9042
Error 5 0.1211595 0.02423 Prob > F
C. Total 6 1.3304340 0.0009
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| Std Beta Min Value Max Value
Intercept 0.899177 0.06355 14.15 <.0001 0  
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Appendix O. NASA Low Schedule Growth Linear Regression Model Output 
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Summary of Fit 
  
RSquare 0.276105
RSquare Adj 0.230861
Root Mean Square Error 0.181377
Mean of Response 0.249582
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 35
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 2 0.4015266 0.200763 6.1026
Error 32 1.0527272 0.032898 Prob > F
C. Total 34 1.4542538 0.0057
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| Std Beta Min Value Max Value
Intercept 0.252222 0.033681 7.49 <.0001 0  
Northrop Grumman 0.2429117 0.110001 2.21 0.0345 0.333603 0 1
Johns Hopkins -0.27371 0.110001 -2.49 0.0182 -0.3759 0 1
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Appendix P. NASA Low Schedule Growth Linear Regression Model Output: 
Influential Data Point Removed 
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Actual by Predicted Plot   Residual by Predicted Plot 
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Root Mean Square Error 0.168731
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Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 2 0.5631070 0.281554 9.8894
Error 31 0.8825755 0.028470 Prob > F
C. Total 33 1.4456826 0.0005
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| Std Beta Min Value Max Value
Intercept 0.252222 0.031333 8.05 <.0001 0  
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